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Congress has attempted to encourage the growth of private 
employee benefit plans' by insuring national uniformity through 
the development of a federal common law for employee benefit 
plans2 through the Employment Income Retirement Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA). 3 ERISA contains an explicit provision to safe-
guard this goal of uniformity which provides that federal law takes 
precedence over state law. This preemption provision states that 
ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... " 4 
There is, however, a serious threat to this goal. Some confusion 
remains as to whether ERISA applies to disputes over certain types 
of employee benefit plans.5 In the presence of ERISA preemption, 
some state courts cannot determine if they have subject matter 
jurisdiction, 6 that is, power to entertain an action relating to an 
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I. See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text. 
2. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, llO-ll (1989) 
(quoting 129 CONG. REc. S29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen . Javits: "It is also intended that 
a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues 
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.")); Pilot Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-57 (1987); infra notes 349-61 and accompanying text. 
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C .). 
4. 29 U.S.C. § ll44(a) (1988). See infra note 223 and accompanying text for the 
complete text. 
5. See, e.g., Denton v. First Nat'! Bank, 765 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985) (The trial 
court heard the case twice because the parties were initially unaware of ERISA's application 
to denial of a lump sum payment from a defined benefit plan.). 
6. One trial judge lamented: 
I have not gone and read these cases, this multitude of cases that you've cited 
in this thing. But, just for the record, and this is worth zero, I think it's 
absolutely ridiculous that this question appears to be so unclear, even to federal 
courts, as to what state courts can and cannot do. And, the matter to me, and 
this may be a serious oversimplification of the problem, is that they probably 
need to state that state courts cannot hear any matter regarding Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act cases, period. But, I don't know whether I have 
jurisdiction or not. 
Ames v. Ames, 757 S.W.2d 468, 480-81 (Tex . Ct. App. 1988) (quoting the transcript of 
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ERISA plan. State courts generally possess residual subject matter 
jurisdiction and may entertain any action not expressly forbidden. 7 
Federal courts, on the contrary, may only consider those matters 
expressly permitted by Congress or the Constitution.8 In the pres-
ence of this confusion, many courts have held that ERISA pre-
emption is waived if not timely raised in the trial court. 9 
This result frustrates the purpose of ERISA preemption. If 
appellate courts permit state actions involving employee benefit 
plans as a result of these procedural errors waiving preemption, 
then, rather than the nationally uniform federal common law which 
Congress desired, bodies of state common law will emerge which 
would govern employee benefit plans in those jurisdictions. The 
existence of state common law, which specifies varying fiduciary 
duties and plan interpretations, will deter some multistate employ-
ers from adopting new plans or continuing old ones. 10 The potential 
for state extracontractual damages in connection with employee 
benefit plans will similarly discourage other employers. 11 This 
double jeopardy of expanded liability and expanded damages could 
undermine Congress's attempt to place the cost of private employee 
benefit plans on private employers by encouraging voluntary plan 
growth. 
This Article first examines the problem currently facing the 
appellate courts as to whether a party may initially raise ERISA 
preemption after trial or on appeal. The Article then reviews the 
various approaches to the problem by the appellate courts. Next, 
the Article examines the preemption principle enunciated by the 
Supreme Court under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)12 
the trial court) (a case involving wrongful conversion of funds that the administrator should 
have paid as a liquidation distribution from a terminated profit-sharing plan), aff'd & 
modified, 776 S.W.2d !54 (Tex . 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1809 (1990); see also Hughes 
v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 848 , 263 Cal. Rptr . 850, 859 (1989), cert. dismissed, 
110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); Van De Hey v. United States Nat'l Bank, 90 Or. App. 258, 262-
263, 752 P.2d 848, 850 (1988). 
7. See, e.g., TEx. CoNST. art . 5, § 8. 
8. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, cl. 2. See generally !3 C. WRIGHT, A . MILLER, & E. 
COOPER, fEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522, at 60 (2d ed. 1985). 
9. See infra notes 106-15, 152-82 and accompanying text. 
10. See Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarran-Ferguson Act: The Need for 
Congressional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 51 (1979) (suggesting that "plan administrators, 
faced with hopelessly inconsistent federal and state regulations and contradictory judicial 
pronouncements," will terminate employee benefit plans). 
II. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
12. Wagner Act, Pub . L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
151-69 (1988)). 
To determine the procedural effect of preemption of a particular statute requires exam-
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that some appellate courts regard as dispositive. The Article then 
explores the failure of the appellate courts to follow the ERISA 
mandate. Finally, the Article outlines the analysis appellate courts 
should conduct relating the legislative intent to the procedural 
effect of ERISA preemption in answering the question of whether 
a party can waive the preemption. 13 
This Article asserts that ERISA preemption is jurisdictional and, 
therefore, may be raised for the first time on appeal. This approach 
gives ERISA preemption the same procedural effect as NLRA 
preemption and preserves a uniform federal common law with 
respect to employee benefit plans, thereby encouraging the growth 
of private employee benefit plans. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
There are two types of employee benefit plans-single-employer 
plans in which a firm sponsors plans for its employees only, and 
multiple-employer plans in which several firms sponsor one plan 
for all of their employees. 14 Most multiple-employer plans are 
"multiemployer plans" maintained pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement designed to benefit the labor union members of 
several employers. 15 
A. Nongovernmental Civil Actions and Jurisdiction 
Government regulation for multiemployer plans and single-em-
ployer, union-negotiated plans began with the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA). 16 This Act primarily regulates 
collective bargaining agreements. LMRA resembles NLRA in that 
both lack an express preemption provision. 17 Section 302(c)(5) of 
ination of the legislative intent. NLRA, however, possesses no express preemption provision. 
Therefore, NLRA preemption rests solely on implication by the Supreme Court in San 
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959), based on the theory 
that the congressional Act so occupies the field as to preclude state regulation. See also 
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 
346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 
330 u.s. 767, 776-77 (1947). 
13. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has criticized the circuit courts for not 
examining legislative history where so directed . United Mine Workers Health & Retirement 
Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1982) (circuit court ignored the text and legislative 
history of the Taft-Hartley Act and relied on case law to apply reasonableness to review a 
trustee's nondiscretionary finding under a collective bargaining agreement) . 
14. J. LONGBEIN & B . WOLK , PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 48 (1990). 
15 . 29 u.s.c. § 1002(37) (1988). 
16. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub . L. No. 80-101 , 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988)). 
17. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). 
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LMRA requires the trustees of multiemployer plans to operate 
them for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employee-benefici-
aries.18 Under this Section the courts have implied a number of 
nongovernmental, civil actions, such as lawsuits by employers, 
employee-beneficiaries, or trustees to enforce fiduciary duties, 19 or 
by employee-beneficiaries for benefits due. 20 Section 301(a) of 
LMRA provides specific causes of action to enforce collective 
bargaining agreements,21 thereby affecting both multiemployer and 
single-employer, union-negotiated employee plans. Under this pro-
vision trustees have sued employers for contributions,22 and em-
ployee-beneficiaries have sued for benefits due. 23 Both state and 
federal courts have jurisdiction for lawsuits under Section 301 or 
Section 302.24 
18. 29 U.S.C . § 186(c)(5) (1988) (prohibiting employer payments to labor unions except 
for payments to employee trust funds for the sole and exclusive benefit of their employees 
and beneficiaries). 
In the employee benefit area, LMRA attempted to eliminate the extortion, bribery, and 
mismanagement plaguing union pension and welfare plans by controlling their establishment 
and operation. Landau, Menholtz & Perkins, Protecting a Potential Pensioner's Pension-
An Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees ' Fiduciary Obligations and Vesting, 
40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 521, 535-41 (1974) . Congress also became concerned that union 
officials might convert plan resources to their own use, and, through LMRA, made it 
illegal to set up a pension plan administered solely by a union. !d. at 535. Union officials 
could only participate in plan administration and fund management as members of a board 
of trustees on which both labor and management were equally represented. See § 186(c)(5)(B). 
As a result, labor unions have developed two types of pension plans: (1) plans jointly 
administered by both union and management, exempted from the LMRA provisions 
proscribing payments to union officials, id. ; and (2) plans, resulting from collective 
bargaining administered unilaterally by employers, and subject to the proscription . See, 
Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pension Arbitration in the 1980's, 16 CowM. 
J .L. & Soc. PROB. 269, 271 (1980). Both settled disputes through arbitration prior to 
ERISA. !d. at 276. 
19. See, e.g., Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977) (employees 
sued trustees for damages for failure to get employer to contribute), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1013 (1978); Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1975) (new trustees sued old trustees 
to invalidate a self-dealing contract); Employing Plasterers' Ass'n v. Journeymen Plasterers' 
Protective & Benevolent Soc'y Local 5, 279 F .2d 92 (7th Cir. 1960) (employers sued to 
enjoin plan administrator's misuse of funds, primarily for political contributions). 
20. See, e.g. , Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F .2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S . 
964 (1964). 
21. 29 U.S.C . § 185(a) (1988) (may bring suit in federal court without meeting diversity 
requirements). 
22. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Bernard, 359 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1966). 
23. See, e.g. , Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1976). 
24. The LMRA provision for collective bargaining agreements states that these suits 
"may be brought" in federal court, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1978), but a litigant may also 
bring the lawsuit in state court. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 
(1962). Litigants have brought suits in state court to enforce contribution requirements in 
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The more comprehensive regulation of these collectively bar-
gained plans and most of the remaining single-employer plans 
began with ERISA. For these plans ERISA specifies reporting and 
disclosure requirements,25 participation and vesting requirements,26 
funding requirements,27 and fiduciary standards. 28 Each plan gen-
erally possesses three fiduciaries-the employer who sponsors the 
plan for his employees29 and appoints the other fiduciaries, 30 the 
trustee who manages the assets of the plan,31 and the plan admin-
istrator who operates the plan.J2 
ERISA differs from LMRA by specifically providing for pre-
emption of state law and for express actions with jurisdictional 
limits. Section 502(a) of ERISA authorizes several types of express, 
nongovernmental, civil lawsuits by the plan's fiduciaries and em-
ployee-beneficiaries, for example: (1) an employee-beneficiary suit 
for information;33 (2) an employee-beneficiary or fiduciary suit to 
enjoin violations of ERISA or to obtain other equitable relief to 
redress such violations, or enjoin violations of the plan or enforce 
its provisions;34 and (3) an employee-beneficiary lawsuit for benefits 
due.JS Unlike LMRA practice, the non-benefits-due litigant must 
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Local 552, Journeymen Barbers v. Sealey, 368 
Mich. 585, 118 N.W.2d 837 (1962); List Indus. v. Gelber, II Misc. 2d 735, 175 N.Y.S.2d 
800 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
The LMRA provision for employee plans states that federal courts "shall have jurisdiction 
... to restrain violations of this section." 29 U.S.C . § 186(e) (1988). Congress drafted 
this provision, however, to avoid the anti-injunction requirements of the Norris-Laguardia 
Act, Pub . L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 
(1988)). See 93 Cong. Rec. S4678 (daily ed. May 7, 1947) (statement of Sen. Ball) . As a 
result, courts have claimed that state jurisdiction also exists for restraining violations. See, 
e.g., Nixon v. O'Callaghan, 392 F. Supp. 1081 , 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (removal case for 
benefits due where the removal statute required state jurisdiction for removal) . But see 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1988) (state jurisdiction no longer required); Cox v. Superior Court of 
San Bernadino Co., 52 Cal. 2d 855, 346 P.2d 15 (1959) (writ of prohibition against 
employer's enforcement of breaches of fiduciary duties) . 
25. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1021-31 (1988). 
26. !d. §§ 1051-61. 
27. Id. §§ 1081-86. 
28. !d. §§ 1101-14. 
29. Id. §§ 1002(16)(B), (21)(A). 
30. See, e.g., H .R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong ., 2d Sess. 272, 323 (1974) 
("fiduciaries includes officers and directors of a plan, members of a plan 's investment 
committee and persons who select these individuals), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNo. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5103 [hereinafter H .R. CONF. REP. No. 1280] . 
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(14)(A), 1002(21)(A), 1103(a) (1988). 
32. !d. §§ 1002(!4)(A), (!6)(A), (21)(A). 
33. !d. §§ 1132(a)(!)(A), 1132(c). 
34. Id. § 1132(a)(3). 
35 . !d. § I 132(a)(l)(B). 
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bring suit in federal court under the jurisdictional provlSlon of 
ERISA, Section 502(e). 36 The preemption provision, Section 514, 
preempts all state law relating to employee benefit plans. 37 
B. Preemption 
1. Implied Preemption 
The express preemption provisiOn raises the question of what 
standard to use in determining whether a specific state law is 
preempted under the Constitution's supremacy clause. 38 In the 
absence of an express preemption provision, courts commonly 
imply preemption by using one of two standards to determine 
whether a state law unconstitutionally obstructs the purposes of a 
congressional act. First, does the state law conflict or interfere 
with federallaw, 39 and, second, does federal law occupy the field? 40 
Under both of these standards, the court must seek evidence of 
congressional intent to preempt. 41 
When dealing with implied preemption, the court should choose 
the interpretation which creates the least possible displacement of 
state law.42 The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger devel-
oped a tendency to find no implied preemption of _state law by 
fitting state laws into federal enactments rather tlf'an finding a 
conflict or federal occupation of the field. 43 
36. /d. § 1132(e)(l); see also infra note 225. 
37. /d. § 1144(a); see also infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. 
38. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. 
39. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 
(1965) . Even if conflict theory applied to a statute with an express preemption provision, 
however, it would not be useful for ERISA preemption purposes because Congress also 
intended to exclude state laws that were consistent with ERISA. See Metropolitan Life Ins . 
Co. v. Massachusetts , 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 
85, 98-99 (1983)); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee 
Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1313, 1316 (1984). 
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) I, 8-18 (1824); see also Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U.S . 497, 504 (1978) (pre-ERISA; NLRA does not preempt the Minnesota 
Private Pension Benefit Protection Act); Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemp-
tion, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 526-33. Occupancy theory does not apply to ERISA due to 
the express preemption provision. Kilberg & Inman, supra note 39, at 1315-16. 
41. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. , 357 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1958). 
42. Kilberg & Inman, supra note 39, at 1316. 
43 . See generally J . NowAK, R. RoTUNDA, & J. YouNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 295-
300 (3d ed. 1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-25 to 6-29 (2d ed . !988); 
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism & the Burger Court, 
75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975); Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE 
L .J. 363 (1978). 
1991] ERISA PREEMPTION 303 
2. Express Preemption 
In contrast, an express preemption provision limits the judicial 
inquiry to consideration of the text of the preemption provision.44 
For express preemption the court's goal is to prevent subtle or 
incremental encroachment into a field Congress has chosen ex-
pressly to reserve for federal law .45 
Even when a statute has an express preemption provision, the 
court must still determine the extent to which state law is affected 
because it is unlikely that Congress contemplated preemption of 
all state laws potentially touching on a particular state-law-related 
field. 46 Therefore, the judicial inquiry focuses on the type of state 
laws Congress actually considered.47 Unfortunately, courts consid-
ering ERISA preemption have failed to rigorously apply the text 
of the ERISA preemption provision to the facts of a particular 
case.48 
C. A voiding State Causes of Action 
The ERISA preemption issue typically arises in the context of 
benefits-due lawsuits. Employee-beneficiaries desiring benefits from 
employee benefit plans normally apply to plan administrators or 
their designees,49 who rule on the application.50 If the plan admin-
istrator denies the application, the employee-beneficiary must first 
appeal the decision to the plan administrator. 51 If the plan admin-
istrator does not reverse the decision,52 the employee-beneficiary 
44. See Kilman & Inman, supra note 39, at 1316. 
45. !d. 
46 . Hirsch, supra note 40, at 538-49. 
47. !d. at 540-41. 
48. !d. 
49. Any designee of a plan administrator is also a fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) 
(1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(2) (1988); McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. 
Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (insurer with authority to deny or grant 
claims was a fiduciary under ERISA); Schulist v. Blue Cross, 553 F. Supp. 248, 252 (N.D. 
Ill. 1982) (same), aff'd, 717 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1983). 
50. ERISA provides that the plan administrator must have a procedure for making a 
claim, communicating the denial to the employee-beneficiary, and appealing the decision . 
29 U.S .C. § 1133 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1988). 
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1988). 
52. The employee-beneficiary must exhaust the plan's appeal procedure before bringing 
the benefit denial to a court. See, e.g. , Jenkins v. Local 705 Int ' l Bhd. of Teamsters 
Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 568 
(9th Cir. 1980). But see Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus ., Inc., 727 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 
1984) (an exception to exhaustion for retirees who are not owed a duty of fair representation 
by the union), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985). 
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may sue for recovery of benefits due under the plan. 53 The em-
ployee-beneficiary may file a benefits-due action in either state 
court or federal court under ERISA's jurisdictional provision.54 
There are several drawbacks to using an ERISA lawsuit to 
recover benefits due to employee-beneficiaries. Notably, the court 
will review the plan administrator's discretionary decision under 
the favorable arbitrary and capricious standard,55 and the em-
ployee-beneficiary must prove that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. 56 Once the employee-beneficiary meets this burden of 
proof, the court will uphold the plan administrator's decision if it 
finds substantial evidence and a rational reason to support the 
decision. 57 Most plan administrators can easily satisfy this burden 
of proof. 
To avoid this deferential standard,58 some advocates for em-
ployee-beneficiaries have recast the lawsuits as arising under state 
law, frequently as bad-faith claims-processing.59 A lawsuit over a 
53 . 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988). 
54. !d. § 1132(e)(l); see also infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
55. See, e.g. , Flint, ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. 
L. REv. 133 (1989) (note especially the cases cited in the article). 
56. See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 
1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983). 
57 . See, e.g. , Flint, supra note 55, at 139-43. 
58 . See, e.g. , Taylor v. Blue Cross/ Blue Shield, 684 F . Supp. 1352, 1359 (E.D. La. 
1988) (preemption where the state statute's standard for denial of benefits was "just and 
reasonable," rather than "arbitrary and capricious"). 
59. See, e.g. , Pilot Life Ins . Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1987) (long-term 
disability plan paid benefits irregularly); Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 
760, 761-62 (5th Cir. 1989) (group medical plan denied reimbursement of medical and 
hospitalization expenses for a prolonged illness); Kelley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 882 F .2d 
453, 454-55 (lOth Cir. 1989) (long-term disability plan refused to pay medical bills incurred 
after settlement); Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 87 (11th Cir. 
1989) (group travel accident insurance issued pursuant to an employee benefit plan denied 
the death benefit for a death on a non-business trip); Dueringet v. General Am. Life Ins. 
Co., 842 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1988) (disability plan denied payments for reconstructive 
surgery because employee was not totally disabled without it); Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. 
Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1988) (medical plan delayed paying airline, 
physician, and hospital bills), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989); Hughes v. Blue Cross, 
215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 846, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857-58 (1989) (group medical plan used a 
standard of medical necessity that departed significantly from community standards and 
failed to properly investigate the claim), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); Goodrich 
v. General Tel. Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 675, 241 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1987) (long-term disability 
plan delayed payment of benefits), rev. granted, 44 Cal. 3d 231, 746 P.2d 871, 242 Cal. 
Rptr. 732 (1987); Drummond v. McDonald Corp., 167 Cal. App. 3d 428, 430, 213 Cal. 
Rptr . 164, 165 (1985) (same); see also Mandel, Must Claims Denials Be Upheld Under 
Arbitrary and Capricious-What Standard of Review Applies to Group Policies Issued to 
ERISA Plans?, 19 FoRUM 457 (1984) (suggesting insurance companies convert state bad-
faith claims-processing cases into federal ERISA claims to take advantage of the arbitrary 
and capricious rule). 
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state cause of action also provides the employee-beneficiary with 
advantages otherwise unobtainable under an ERISA action. For 
example, state constitutions generally permit jury trials for state 
actions in state court. 60 An ERISA action brought in federal court, 
however, generally does not involve a jury trial. 61 A few state 
courts permit a jury trial when an ERISA action is before them. 62 
60. See, e.g., CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 16 (right to jury trial shall remain inviolate); N. Y. 
CoNST. art. I, § 2 (same); TEx. CoNST. art. I, § 15 (same); see also Egelko, Losing Faith 
in Bad Faith: Suing Insurers for Handling Claims in Bad Faith was a Popular Pastime-
Until Last Spring, 7 CAL. LAw Oct. 1987, at 27, 28 . 
61. Federal courts generally find no right to a jury trial for benefits-due suits under 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988), because the ERISA suit is an equitable action 
or may involve legal questions only. See, e.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647, 
649-50 (3d Cir. 1990) (equitable); Pane v. RCA Corp. , 868 F .2d 631 , 636 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(equitable); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
826 (1988); Nevill v. Shell Oil Co. , 835 F .2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1987) (following equitable 
precedent); Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., Inc., 814 F .2d 620, 623 (lith Cir. 1987) 
(following Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97 (5th 
Cir. 1979)); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 
521, 527 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp ., 
770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1985) (equitable), cert. denied, 474 U.S . 1058 (1986); Berry v. 
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (not a fact question); Blau v. Del 
Monte Corp., 748 F .2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (following equitable precedent), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); In re Vorpahl , 695 F .2d 318, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1982) (equitable); 
Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F .2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980) (not a fact question); Wardle v. 
Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(equitable), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981) . Contra Puz v. Bessemer Cement Co ., 700 
F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (contractual in nature); Abbarno v. Carborundum Co., 
682 F . Supp. 179, 181-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (legal question); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 
114 F .R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (contractual in nature); Paladino v. Taxicab 
Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp . 37 , 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (legal question); Pollack v. 
Castrovinci, 476 F . Supp. 606, 609 (S .D.N.Y. 1979) (legal question), aff'd without op. , 
622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980); Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. 
Supp . 745, 747 (E .D. Mich . 1977) (legal question). See generally Comment, The Right to 
Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions under Section 502(a)(l)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARV . L. 
REv . 737 (1983) (explaining the two grounds for denial as: (I) viewing the arbitrary and 
capricious review standard as a legal question and not a fact question; and (2) viewing the 
matter as an equitable one because it involves a trust) . 
62. Some state courts will grant a jury trial under a state constitutional provision 
despite ERISA preemption. See, e.g. , Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 94 N.C. App. 
602, 613-14, 381 S.E.2d 330, 338 (1989). In other cases, the parties do not question the 
right. See, e.g. , Herbst v. Humana Health Ins., Inc. , 105 Nev. 114, 114, 781 P .2d 762, 
763 (1989); Felts v. Graphic Arts Employee Benefit Trust, 680 S.W.2d 891, 892-93 (Tex . 
Ct. App . 1984). 
Other state courts follow the federal district court decisions permitting jury trials. See, 
e.g., Walker v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co ., Inc., 144 Misc. 2d 308, 308-10, 544 N.Y.S.2d 
958, 959-60 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Fuller v. INA Life Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 2d 464, 466-69, 533 
N.Y.S .2d 215, 217-18 (Sup. Ct. 1988). Contra Pfeiffer v. Roux Labs., Inc., 547 So. 2d 
1271, 1272 (Fiji. App . 1989). 
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Moreover, the employee-beneficiary can recover extracontractual 
damages for delays in benefit payment and infliction of emotional 
distress in a state action,63 but not in an ERISA action.64 The most 
considerable advantage of the state action is the possibility of 
punitive damages.65 In a benefits-due ERISA action by an em-
ployee-beneficiary, the courts generally prohibit recovery of puni-
tive damages.66 
Unfortunately for the employee-beneficiary, ERISA preempts 
state lawsuits for bad-faith claims-processingY The plan adminis-
trator should timely raise the ERISA preemption issue to insure 
that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies and to avoid the 
risk of jury trials, extracontracttial damages, or punitive damages. 68 
63. Egelko, supra note 60; see also, e.g. , Kanne v. Connecticut Gen . Life Ins. Co. , 
607 F. Supp. 899, 906 (C .D. Cal. 1985) (ERISA group medical plan insurer liable for 
payment delays of nine months and emotional distress damages) , rev'd, 867 F.2d 489 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989) . See generally 
Kornblum & Olson , California Leads the Way in Bad Faith, But No One Wants to Follow-
Recent Trends in California First Party Bad Faith Law, 14 WEST. ST. U. L. REv. 37 
(1986). 
64. See, e.g., Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng' rs Beneficial Assoc., 857 F.2d 514, 
518 (9th Cir. 1988) (infliction of emotional distress); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins . 
Co ., 846 F.2d 821, 825 (1st Cir .) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S . 909 (1988); Sokol v. 
Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. 
Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986) . See 
generally Comment, Participant and Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual 
and Punitive Damages after Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 
CoRNELL L. REv. 1014 (1986) (arguing that courts should permit extracontractual damages). 
65 . See, e.g. , Kanne, 607 F. Supp. at 910 (insurer under an ERISA group medical 
plan liable for punitive damages); see also Egelko, supra note 60. 
66. See, e.g. , Johnson , 857 F.2d at 518; Drinkwater, 846 F.2d at 825; Varhola v. 
Doe, 820 F .2d 809, 817 (6th Cir . 1987); Kleinhans v. Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust , 810 
F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long-Term Disability Trust , 
787 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1986); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing 
Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., 793 F .2d 1456, 1464-65 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Powell, 780 F .2d at 424; Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 653 
F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 1084 (1981); see also Comment, 
ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 743 
(1984-85); Comment, supra note 64 (arguing against recovery of punitive damages). 
67 . Pilot Life Ins. Co . v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1987); see also Egelko, supra 
note 60; Barnes, Pilot Life v. Dedeaux: ERISA Preempts Bad Faith Claims Against 
Insurers, 61 Wis. B. BuLL. Feb. 1988, at 17. 
68 . Raising the preemption issue as an affirmative defense avoids the current problem 
in some appellate courts concerning ERISA preemption in relationship to subject matter 
jurisdiction. See, e.g. , HECI Exploration Co . v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 
1988) (to prevent waiver of ERISA preemption the respondent must plead it as an affirmative 
defense); Dueringer v. General Am. Life Ins . Co ., 842 F. 2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); 
Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App . 3d 832, 851, 263 Cal. Rptr . 850, 861 (1989) (same), 
cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); Castillo v. Neely's TBA Dealer Supply, Inc., 776 
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Some plan administrators' counsel, however, have failed to raise 
this issue until appeal,69 perhaps confused about the application 
of ERISA to a lawsuit. 70 The question then is whether the plan 
administrator has waived ERISA preemption. If so, the court may 
treat the case as a state action regardless of the ERISA provisions 
designed to encourage uniform treatment of voluntary private 
employee benefit plans. 71 
Some employee-beneficiary lawyers have charged that the prob-
lem arises from an "appellate ambush" by the plan administrator 
who intentionally raised no objections in trial court only to raise 
ERISA preemption on appeal after losing at trial with state law 
defenses.n This charge may have some validity for actions brought 
in federal court and those state actions hot involving benefits due. 
The appellate court will dismiss these actions if it determines the 
employee-beneficiary should have alleged an ERISA cause of action 
at trial, and the statute of limitations may bar refiling these 
lawsuits.73 The charge has less validity for benefits-due actions in 
state court because some state courts permit amendment of the 
petition on finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 74 Even 
when the plan administrator succeeds in forcing the employee-
beneficiary to drop the lawsuit, the ambush will result in the plan 
administrator or the employer incurring liability for additional 
expenses. 
As a fiduciary, the plan administrator's duty is solely to all 
employee-beneficiaries and includes protecting plan funds. 75 One 
S.W.2d 290, 292, 294 (Tex . Ct. App. 1989) (same); see also Kanne, 607 F. Supp. at 902 
(pled ERISA preemption as an affirmative defense); Lambert v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins . 
Co ., 211 Cal. App. 3d 456, 463-64, 259 Cal. Rptr. 398, 402 (1989) (same). Contra Calhoon 
v. Bonnabel, 560 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ERISA preemption is not an 
affirmative defense as ERISA provides the plaintiff with an express cause of action); 
Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins . Co ., 764 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (writ 
granted) (ERISA preemption unsuccessfully attacked as not pled as an affirmative defense), 
Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted) (same). 
69. See infra notes 82-182 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
71. See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text. 
72. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Writ of Error at 39, Great N. Am. Stationers, Inc. v. 
Ball, 770 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
73. Federal courts will dismiss actions if subject matter jurisdiction is not clear from 
the pleadings. FED. R. Crv. P . 12(h)(3); see 13 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 3522, at 73 . 
Also, the federal statute of limitations period is not tolled by the erroneous filing . 4 C. 
WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 1056, at 187 (a dismissal without prejudice has the same effect 
as if the petition were never filed). 
74. See, e.g. , Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co ., 779 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989) (The trial 
court is required to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend in order to establish 
jurisdiction before granting a motion to dismiss, unless the amendment would be useless. ). 
75 . 29 U.S .C. § 1104(a) (1988) . 
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of the fiduciary's duties is to insure that the plan only incurs 
reasonable expenses. 76 The fiduciary is liable to reimburse the plan 
for any unreasonable expenses incurred, such as those generated 
by the proposed additional litigation.77 Moreover, if the fiduciary 
pays these expenses, the plan cannot reimburse the fiduciary be-
cause, under ERISA, the fiduciary is entitled to reimbursement 
only for reasonable expenses properly and actually incurred, not 
unreasonable attorney's fees. 78 
The fiduciary may be indemnified by the employer, however. 
Department of Labor regulations permit indemnity agreements to 
the extent that insurance is available. 79 ERISA permits plans to 
purchase insurance for a fiduciary, if the insurer has recourse 
against the fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty. 80 The employer 
is permitted to purchase insurance for the fiduciary without the 
recourse limitation. 81 Therefore, either the fiduciary or the em-
ployer will bear the cost of the proposed additional litigation. As 
a result, it is generally in the best interest of the fiduciary and the 
employer to resolve the dispute quickly by discouraging frivolous 
state lawsuits through consistent use of ERISA preemption. 
II. COURT RULINGS ON WAIVER OF ERISA PREEMPTION 
Several appellate courts have considered whether a plan admin-
istrator has waived ERISA preemption by not raising the issue 
before the trial court. Courts use two basic approaches to review 
federal preemption. First, preemption is an affirmative defense 
that a respondent must raise in the trial court or forever waive.82 
Second, preemption is a challenge to the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction that a party may raise at anytime. 83 As jurisdiction 
76 . /d. § !104(a)(l)(A)(ii) . 
77 . !d. § 1109. See generally Cornell & Little, Indemnification of Fiduciary and 
Employee Litigation Costs under ERISA, 25 B.C.L. REv. I, 32 (1983) (specifying the 
situations for which the fiduciary may be indemnified for attorney's fees as a proper 
expense, but declaring that incurring unreasonable attorney's fees is a breach of fiduciary 
duty). 
78. 29 U.S .C. § 1108(c)(2) (1988). 
79. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (1990). 
80. 29 U.S.C. § lllO(b) (1988). 
81. !d. 
82. International Longshoremen' s Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 382-86 (1986) . 
83 . /d. For a state court, federal preemption would constitute a challenge to the 
court ' s subject matter jurisdiction in those cases where federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction, such as bankruptcy proceedings, patent and copyright cases, forfeitures under 
the laws of the United States, admiralty and maritime cases, and violations of the federal 
anti-trust laws, securities acts, and the natural gas act. See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. 
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differs for each of the two types of ERISA nongovernmental civil 
lawsuits,84 some courts have reached conflicting results over ERISA 
preemption as subject matter jurisdiction which depend on the 
type of ERISA action. 85 Despite the conflict between the courts 
over ERISA preemption,86 most courts have determined that ERISA 
preemption is nonwaivable in non-benefits-due lawsuits. Courts 
have split, however, over benefits-due lawsuits. 
A. Non-Benefits-Due Litigation 
Six state courts have decided non-benefits-due cases involving 
ERISA preemption initially raised after trial or on appeal. Four 
courts determined that the litigant had not waived the preemption; 
two found the litigants had waived ERISA preemption. Only three 
of these courts confronted the issue squarely, and all three con-
cluded in favor of nonwaivability. 
1. Nonwaivable 
The primary argument advanced by two courts for the non-
waivability of the ERISA preemption in non-benefits-due lawsuits 
is that jurisdiction lies exclusively with the federal courts.87 An 
App. 3d 832, 848-50, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 859-60 (1989) (an ERISA case), cert. dismissed, 
110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10, at 36 (4th ed. 1983). 
Under ERISA, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of non-benefits-due lawsuits, 
suggesting ERISA preemption for these lawsuits may be nonwaivable. See Hughes, 215 
Cal. App. 3d at 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (making a distinction between the two types 
of ERISA civil actions). 
84. The two types, of course, are benefits-due and non-benefits-due lawsuits. See supra 
notes 36 & 54 and accompanying text. 
85 . See, e.g., Hughes, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 860. 
86. See HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 1988). 
87 . See Young ·v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass 'n, 112 Misc. 2d 692, 700-01, 447 
N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Richland Hosp., Inc. v. Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d 87, 
93, 516 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (1987); accord Guthrie v. Dow Chern. Co., 445 F. Supp. 311, 
315 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (in employee action to have benefit reduction for worker's compen-
sation declared illegal, removal was denied because state court lacked jurisdiction); Time 
Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 191 Ga. App . 766, 768-69, 382 S.E.2d 718, 719-20 (1989) (in employee 
suit to enforce fiduciary's duty to plan, dicta described ERISA preemption for non-benefits-
due lawsuits as relating to subject matter jurisdiction); see, e.g., Terrell v. Life Ins. Co ., 
174 Ga. App. 753, 753, 331 S.E.2d 609, 610 (1985) (widow's suit for death benefit); Peick 
v. Murray, 141 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1084, 491 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1986) (trustee action to 
recover improperly paid benefits); Prestridge v. Shinault, 552 So. 2d 643, 648 (La. App. 
1989) (trustee lawsuit against the employer), cert. denied, 559 So. 2d 131 (La. 1990); 
McMartin v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 159 Mich. App. 1, 3-4, 
406 N.W.2d 219, 221 (1987) (employee lawsuit for benefit, not by terms of plan, but by 
estoppel); Goldberg v. Caplan, 277 Pa. Super. 47, 52-54, 419 A.2d 653, 656-57 (1980) 
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analogous argument for NLRA preemption has been successfully 
made where exclusive jurisdiction lies with the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB). 88 For purposes of determining jurisdic-
tion only, two courts recast each lawsuit in its proper ERISA form 
and concluded that it did not involve benefits due under ERISA. 89 
In Young v. Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, a 
New York trial level court found that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider a non-benefits-due case although the plaintiff urged a 
recasting under LMRA. 90 The court determined that the ERISA 
jurisdictional provision eliminated the court-created LMRA juris-
diction which would have otherwise provided the court with juris-
diction.91 In Richland Hospital, Inc. v. Ralyon, the Ohio Supreme 
(employer lawsuit to remove trustee); Duffy v. Brannen, 148 Vt. 75, 84-86, 529 A.2d 643 , 
648-49 (1987) (employee lawsuit for violation of fiduciary duties) . 
In Young, an employer sought to enjoin termination of participation of its employees 
by a union-negotiated welfare plan. Young, 112 Misc. 2d at 692-93, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 799. 
The fiduciary's action for relief from a breach of fiduciary duty arises under 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(2) (1988). The plan raised ERISA preemption initially in a posttrial brief. Young, 
112 Misc. 2d at 694, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 800. As recast, the lawsuit did not involve benefits 
due, and the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. /d. at 697, 447 N.Y.S .2d 
at 801. The court properly verified this "plain-meaning" interpretation by examining the 
congressional statements of the Conference Committee Report, Senator Javits, and Rep-
resentative Dent. !d. at 699-700, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 802-03; see infra notes 332, 335 & 353 
and accompanying text. 
In Ralyon, a hospital sued an employee-beneficiary for unpaid medic~) bills where the 
employee-beneficiary cross-claimed misrepresentation of coverage prior to a denial of 
benefits against the employer and its welfare plan . Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 88, 516 
N.E.2d at 1238. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption initially on appeal. !d. To the 
extent the claim involved a breach of fiduciary duty, the state court determined that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because ERISA's preemption provision eliminates all state 
causes of action and its jurisdictional provision permits this type of ERISA lawsuit only 
in federal court. /d. at 90, 92, 516 N.E.2d at 1239, 1241. The misrepresentation action for 
breach of fiduciary duty also arises under 29 U.S.C . § 1132(a)(2). The court felt so strongly 
about this construction under the plain-meaning canon that it did not consider any legislative 
history or prior case law. 
88 . See, e.g. , International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 391-92 
(1986). 
89. See Young, 112 Misc. 2d at 700, 447 N.Y.S .2d at 803 ("A resolution of this 
motion to dismiss rests then upon whether plaintiffs' action may properly be characterized 
as one" stating an ERISA cause of action.); Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 89, 516 N.E.2d at 
1239 n.5 (Because the claims concern fulfillment of plan duties and reconsideration of plan 
terms, the claims relate to the administration of the plan and fall within ERISA's scope.). 
90. Young, 112 Misc. 2d at 701-02, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 804. 
91. /d. The court's LMRA analysis is incorrect. ERISA explicitly provides for the 
continuation of employee benefit regulation under LMRA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988) 
(repealing only the Welfare and Pension Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 
Stat. 997 (1958)). See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1989) (exempting only unilaterally admin-
istered, collectively bargained plans from Department of Labor claims-procedure require-
ments if the plan contains an arbitration procedure); Schneider, supra note 18, at 280-81, 
311 (expressing concern that ERISA may modify traditional labor dispute arbitration) . 
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Court found that it similarly lacked jurisdiction although it retained 
jurisdiction for the associated benefits-due lawsuit. 92 
A second argument for nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in 
non-benefits-due lawsuits was advanced in Cadillac Insurance Co. 
v. L.P. C. Distributing Co. 93 by a Texas appellate court. The court 
observed that only ERISA confers jurisdiction over any type of 
ERISA-related lawsuit. 94 Therefore, if any petition related to an 
ERISA plan fails to allege an ERISA cause of action, the plaintiff 
has not invoked the jurisdiction of the court.95 Rather than recast 
the lawsuit as an ERISA action and conclude that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction, this court noted that the petition alleged an 
ERISA-related cause of action but failed to state an ERISA claim.96 
The court concluded that, because a state court can only assert 
jurisdiction over a claim relating to an ERISA plan through 
ERISA, this petition failed to invoke state court jurisdiction.97 
In Molina v. Retail Clerks Union and Food Employers Benefit 
Fund, 98 a California appellate court dealt with ERISA preemption 
raised initially on appeal and found no waiver.99 The court con-
92. Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 90, 516 N.E.2d at 1239. Although the court had recast 
the petition as an ERISA cause of action to determine jurisdiction, it did not recast the 
petition for substantive review and remanded the benefits-due action for reconsideration 
· under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard. /d. at 93, 516 N.E.2d at 1242; see infra 
note 137. 
93 . 770 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). In Cadillac, an employer sued an insurance 
carrier for wrongful termination of a group insurance policy under a welfare plan . /d. at 
893. The insurance carrier raised ERISA preemption for the first time on appeal to defeat 
a default judgment. /d. at 895 . The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. /d. at 896. 
94. /d. at 895 (the plaintiff failed to allege an ERISA cause of action or a preemption 
exception. Therefore, the petition did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial 
court.). 
95. /d. at 895. 
96. /d. 
97 . /d. The court relied solely on benefits-due case law for support. See Barry v. 
Dymo Graphic Sys.,' Inc., 394 Mass. 830, 835, 478 N.E.2d 707, 711 (1985) (disapproved 
by Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S. Ct. 1668 (1989)); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 
710, 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted) . This approach avoids the bifurcation of 
ERISA preemption. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
98. Ill Cal. App. 3d 872, 168 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1980). 
99. /d. at 878-79, 168 Cal. Rptr . at 909-10. The Molina court affirmed a judgment 
granting reimbursement to a union welfare plan from an employee-beneficiary where the 
plan initially raised ERISA preemption on appeal. Id. Although correctly recognizing that 
ERISA had eradicated state law and jurisdiction could only be asserted through ERISA, 
the court erred in treating this as a benefits-due lawsuit. See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 
Cal. App . 3d 382, 852, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 862 (1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 
(1990). Because the fiduciary sued as the assignee of the employee-beneficiary to receive 
insurance proceeds, Molina, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 876-77, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 908, the suit 
was one by the fiduciary to recover amounts wrongly paid to an employee-beneficiary 
arising under 29 U.S .C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988), not one by a beneficiary for benefits due. 
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sidered the ERISA preemption issue, however, only because the 
trial court found that the plan was subject to LMRA. 100 
The error in the reasoning advanced in Young and Ralyon can 
be demonstrated by applying it in a hypothetical federal diversity 
action. Relying on ERISA's preemption and jurisdictional provi-
sions to eliminate all state causes of action, the Young-Ralyon 
theory would recast the lawsuit as a non-benefits-due action under 
ERISA for which the state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 
Unlike a state court, after recasting the action as an ERISA 
action, 101 the federal court would continue to have subject matter 
jurisdiction. 102 Therefore, ERISA preemption in the federal court 
does not involve subject matter jurisdiction and is waivable. Under 
Young and Ralyon, state courts would find no waiver where federal 
courts would, and a disparity in ERISA preemption would result. 
The reasoning in Cadillac yields a different result because it uses 
a broader preemption than the Young-Ralyon theory. Because the 
lawsuit is not recast, a federal court applying Cadillac in a diversity 
action involving a non-benefits-due lawsuit would act as a local 
state court. 103 Therefore, as in state court, preemption would be 
nonwaivable. Although federal courts would also have federal 
question jurisdiction, the result would be the same. Under the 
federal pleading rules, a court would recast the claim under ERISA 
and could assert subject matter jurisdiction. 104 This recasting would 
not occur, however, unless the defendant raised ERISA preemption 
before trial. 
This potential disparity between filing in state or federal court 
could adversely affect plans and fiduciaries in two situations. First, 
fiduciaries that are in a federal court using the Young-Ralyon 
reasoning would have to raise ERISA preemption before trial or 
waive it. Second, fiduciaries that remove the lawsuit to a federal 
court using the Young-Ralyon reasoning on the basis of diversity 
rather than federal question jurisdiction, 105 presumably unaware 
100. Molina, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 879, 168 Cal. Rptr . at 909-10. 
101. See 14A C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 3722, at 243; cf. Avco Corp. v. Aero-Lodge 
No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (state action converted to a 
claim under LMRA Section 301 following the preemption exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint doctrine); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co ., 786 F .2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(removal to federal court for federal question jurisdiction), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 960 
(1986). 
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1988). 
103. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
104. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987) (state 
claims may be converted into ERISA claims for purposes of removal) . 
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988) (permitting removal with diversity of citizenship as the 
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that ERISA applies to the non-benefits-due lawsuit, will discover 
that they have waived ERISA preemption. Federal courts relying 
on the Cadillac reasoning, however, would find no waiver of 
ERISA preemption in either case. 
2. Waivable 
Not all state courts have agreed with the Ohio, New York, 
Texas, and California courts. Two other state courts dealt with 
non-benefits-due lawsuits and held that the defendants had waived 
ERISA preemption on other grounds. 106 In both cases, the result 
was the same whether the court recognized or refused to recognize 
the nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in the non-benefits-due 
lawsuit. 107 
In Amalgamated Cotton Garment & Allied Industries Fund v. 
Dion, 108 a Pennsylvania superior court refused to consider an 
ERISA preemption claim raised initially on appeal because the 
defendant had not preserved that point and, therefore, had waived 
it.Hl9 The court noted, however, that the Third Circuit had held 
that ERISA did not preempt the state statute in question, 110 thereby 
indicating that the appellant would have lost had the issue been 
preserved. As a result, the court was not required to pass on the 
question , and the waivability language is only dicta. 
In Castillo v. Neely's TBA Dealer Supply, Inc., 111 a second 
Texas appellate court retracted its own dictum from two prior 
basis for federal jurisdiction provided that no defendant is a citizen of the state in which 
plaintiff brought the action, even if the state court lacks jurisdiction); see also 14A C. 
WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 3722, at 231. 
106. These were, then, multipoint opinions, or ones in which there was more than one 
reason given for the holding . 
107. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 46-47 (1960) (describing the multipoint 
decision as having a force of authority falling between a single-point holding and dicta); 
see also National Metalcrafters v, McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 822-23 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, 
J.) (refusing to fragment further a multipoint decision to avoid weakening the holding 
more). 
108. 341 Pa. Super. 12, 491 A.2d 123 (1985). 
109. /d. at 15, 491 A.2d at 124. In Dian, a plan trustee sued an employer for 
contributions to a union-negotiated welfare plan. /d. at 14, 491 A.2d at 124. The employer, 
having lost at trial court, initially raised preemption on appeal. /d. at 14-15, 491 A.2d at 
124. This recast action is by a fiduciary to enforce an obligation under ERISA. See May 
v. Interstate Moving & Storage Co., 739 F.2d 521 , 522 (lOth Cir. 1984); 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1988). The Dion court cited no authority for determining the waiver of 
ERISA preemption. Dion, 341 Pa. Super. at 15, 491 A.2d at 124. 
110. Dion, 341 Pa. Super at 15, 491 A .2d at 124 (citing Carpenters Health & Welfare 
Fund v. Kenneth Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
Ill. 776 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Ct . App. 1989). In Castillo, an employee sued an employer 
for negligently causing the failure to inform the employee about coverage under a welfare 
plan. /d. at 291. After trial, the employer obtained a judgment-notwithstanding-the-verdict 
on the ground that the jury's finding of negligence was unsupported . /d. at 292. 
314 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
holdings on nonwaivability for benefits-due lawsuits .112 On the 
basis of Fifth and Ninth Circuit benefits-due opinions, 113 the court 
held that the defendant could not raise ERISA preemption after 
trial. 114 The Texas court also noted that no evidence supported 
plaintiff's case, 115 and therefore, if the court had recognized the 
nonwaivability of ERISA preemption, the result would have been 
the same. 
B. Benefits-Due Litigation 
Twelve courts have decided benefits-due cases in which the 
litigants initially raised ERISA preemption after trial or on appeal. 
Six state courts determined the litigant had not waived the pre-
emption, and six state and federal courts found that the litigants 
had waived ERISA preemption. Only four of these courts con-
fronted the issue squarely. Of these, the three state courts con-
cluded in favor of nonwaivability, and the federal circuit court. 
found waiver. 
1. Nonwaivable 
The primary argument advanced by two state courts for the 
nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in benefits-due lawsuits is a 
non-benefits-due argument. Because ERISA exclusively governs 
jurisdiction over an ERISA-related lawsuit, any ERISA-related 
petition that fails to allege an ERISA cause of action does not 
invoke the court's jurisdiction. 116 The courts noted, however, that 
112. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins . Co., 764 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) 
(writ granted); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. , 752 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ 
granted). 
113. HECI Exploration Co . v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1988); Dueringer v. 
General Am. Life Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988); Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, 
Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). These federal opinions, however, apply to benefits-
due lawsuits and not to the non-benefits-due lawsuit at issue in Texas. The reasonings 
developed by appellate courts for waivability differ in the two situations because of the 
jurisdictional difference. 
114. Castillo, 776 S. W .2d at 292-93 (raised initially in an objection to the jury charge). 
The dictum retraction adheres to the principle that Texas courts must follow federal courts' 
construction of federal statutes. See, e.g., Holmes v. Olson, 587 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979) 
(following a Fifth Circuit opinion). 
115. Castillo, 776 S.W.2d at 296 (no evidence of negligence) . 
116. See Providence Hosp. v. National Labor Union Health & Welfare Fund, 162 Mich. 
App. 191, 412 N.W.2d 690 (1987); Hepler v. CBS, Inc., 39 Wash. App. 38, 696 P.2d 596, 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985). 
In Providence, a hospital sued a plan to recover fees as the assignee of the employee-
beneficiary. Providence, 162 Mich. App. at 192-93 , 412 N.W.2d at 691. Having lost at 
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if the plaintiff had brought the lawsuit in its proper ERISA form, 
the lawsuit would involve benefits due under ERISA for which 
the state court had subject matter jurisdiction. 117 
In Providence Hospital v. National Labor Union Health and 
Welfare Fund, 118 the Michigan Court of Appeals remanded the 
case to the trial court for reconsideration under ERISA. 119 In 
Hepler v. CBS, Inc., 120 the Washington Court of Appeals neglected 
to recognize that the plaintiff's petition did not establish subject 
matter jurisdiction. Instead of dismissing or remanding the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court directly applied 
ERISA to the case. 121 It concluded that a lower court would reach 
the same liability result under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious 
standard and modified damages to exclude those which ERISA 
does not permit. 122 The court's direct approach fails to permit the 
litigants or the trial court a chance to examine the dispute or 
develop a record based on the applicable ERISA standard. 
The disparity between these two treatments would make the 
attempt to "avoid ERISA costly to the employee-beneficiary in the 
trial, the defendant first raised ERISA preemption in a motion to amend the judgment. 
ld. at 193, 412 N.W.2d at 691. The court held the defendant had not waived ERISA 
preemption and remanded the case for reconsideration under ERISA. ld. at 200, 412 
N.W.2d at 694. 
In Hepler, an employee sued for breach of contract resulting from wrongly calculating 
disability benefits with an undisclosed formula . Hepler, 39 Wash. App. at 839-43, 696 P.2d 
at 598-600. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption for the first time on · appeal. !d. at 
843, 696 P .2d at 600. Agreeing that the employer had not waived ERISA preemption, the 
court proceeded to apply ERISA to the judgment, primarily the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, and upheld the liability finding and modified damages. ld. at 844-48, 6% P.2d 
at 600-02. 
117. Providence, 162 Mich. App . at 199-200, 412 N.W.2d at 694; Hepler, 39 Wash. 
App. at 845, 696 P .2d at 601. 
118. 162 Mich. App. at 191, 412 N.W.2d at 690. 
119. ld. at 194-95 , 412 N.W.2d at 692, 694 (plaintiff correctly argued that his claim 
was ERISA-based, but he relied impermissibly on Michigan law to enforce his claim) . 
Michigan follows the procedural rule under which, if the appellate court reverses because 
the plaintiff alleged the wrong legal theory, the court should afford the plaintiff an 
opportunity to retry his case rather than dismiss the action (the "retrial opportunity rule"). 
See, e.g., Husted v. Mcintosh, 313 Mich . 507, 509, 21 N.W.2d 833, 834 (1946) (overturning 
a directed verdict based on an erroneous theory of imputed negligence); Bricker v. Green, 
313 Mich. 218, 236, 21 N.W.2d 105, Ill (1946) (same) . This procedural point is of greatest 
significance when the statute of limitations has already run, preventing ordinary refiling. 
120. 39 Wash. App. at 838, 6% P .2d at 596. 
121. ld. at 846-47, 696 P .2d at 601-02. 
122. !d. The Washington court erred in riot remanding. Washington also follows the 
retrial opportunity rule, supra note 119. See, e.g., Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church, 
58 Wash. 2d 166, 169-70, 361 P .2d 637, 639 (1%1) (overturning a trial court dismissal of 
a negligence action based on the fellow servant rule where the employee relationship did 
not exist) . 
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latter jurisdiction. The employee-beneficiary has the burden under 
ERISA to show that the fiduciary's decision is arbitrary and 
capricious. 123 Proof of the state cause of action often does not 
include proof necessary for an ERISA cause of action. 124 As a 
result, when ERISA is applied initially at the appellate level, the 
employee-beneficiaries will lose for failure to carry their burden. 
A second argument, advanced in Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys-
tems, Inc. 125 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, hinges 
on legislative history suggesting that ERISA preemption should be 
as broad as possible. 126 The court compared ERISA preemption to 
NLRA preemption for unfair labor practices. 127 Created by judicial 
fiat, 128 NLRA preemption relates to subject matter jurisdiction, 
which is not waivable. 129 This limits all NLRA disputes to resolution 
123 . See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 
1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983). 
124. See Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ 
granted) (a favorable jury verdict on the state claim resulted in no evidence of fiduciary's 
decision being arbitrary and capricious). 
125. 394 Mass. 830, 478 N.E.2d 707 (1985). 
In Barry, an employee sued for severance pay and vacation benefits. !d. at 832, 478 
N.E.2d at 709. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption for the first time in a supplemental 
brief before the appellate court . !d. 
126. !d. at 836, 478 N.E.2d at 711 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 
98-99 (1983) (quoting 120 CoNG. REc. 29,197 (remarks of Rep. Dent))). 
Barry involved two welfare plans: a severance-pay plan and a vacation-pay plan. !d. at 
832, 478 N.E.2d at 709. Employers had frequently decided that severance-pay plans were 
not ERISA plans. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 951 
(1989) (employer unaware in 1980 that termination-pay plan was subject to ERISA and 
had not complied with ERISA's disclosure requirements); see also Blau v. Del Monte 
Corp ., 748 F .2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984) (employer intentionally did not disclose written 
separation-allowance policy), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). 
Department of Labor regulations, however, make it clear that a severance-pay plan is a 
welfare plan. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1990). Lawyers had doubted that plans for paying 
unused vacation time out of the employer's general assets were subject to ERISA. Compare 
Holland v. National Steel Corp., 791 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that these 
vacation-pay plans constitute welfare plans) and Blakeman v. Mead Containers, 779 F.2d 
1146, 1149 (6th Cir. 1985) (same) with Shea v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 810 
F .2d 372, 376 (2d Cir . 1987) (holding that vacation-pay plans do not constitute welfare 
plans under 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-l(b)(3)) and California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d 
856, 859-61, modified, 783 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986) 
(same) and Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray, 144 Ill. App. 3d 616, 621-
25, 494 N.E.2d 581, 584-87 (1986) (same). The issue was finally settled in favor of the 
Department of Labor regulations in Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S. Ct. 1668, 1671-75 
(1989). 
127. Barry, 394 Mass. at 835, 478 N.E .2d at 711 (citing Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 
725, 437 N.E.2d 1065-66 (1982) (construing NLRA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987)). 
128. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). 
129. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 382, 394 (1986). 
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by the NLRB rather than state or federal courts. 130 Subsequent 
courts have used NLRA preemption to dismiss state causes of 
action brought by employees challenging various labor practices 
under NLRA. 131 Despite the alternative forum (the NLRB versus 
federal or state court) and the implied versus express preemption 
provisions distinguishing NLRA and ERISA, the Massachusetts 
court reasoned that NLRA offered the broadest possible preemp-
tion and concluded that ERISA preemption would be at least as 
extensive as NLRA preemption. 132 The court concluded that ERISA 
preemption was also related to subject matter jurisdiction, 133 and, 
therefore, a litigant cannot waive preemption. 134 The court re-
manded the case for reconsideration as an ERISA lawsuit. 135 
Three courts have indirectly indicated that ERISA preemption 
is nonwaivable. In Ralyon, the Ohio Supreme Court handled 
ERISA preemption equally for both non-benefits-due and benefits-
due, permitting the fiduciary to raise the matter for the first time 
on appeal. 136 The court dismissed the non-benefits-due claim for 
130. Jd. at 391; see also Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1400 
(9th Cir. 1988); Brooks v. A.S. Abell Publishing Co., 635 F . Supp. 118, 119 (D. Md. 
1986); Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees, Local 8 v. Jensen, 51 Wash . App . 676, 
679, 754 P.2d 1277, 1280 (1988). 
131. See, e.g., Clayton v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods., 679 F. Supp. 637, 638-39 (E.D. 
Mich. 1987) (wrongful discharge during strike); Level I Sportswear, Inc. v. Chaikin, 662 
F. Supp. 535, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (employer prevented the establishment of labor union 
through the tort of fraud and deceit) ; Brooks, 635 F. Supp. at 118-19 (tort action against 
employer); Missouri Portland Cement Co . v. United Cement Workers, 153 Ill . App. 3d 
1046, 1048-49, 506 N.E .2d 620, 622-23, appeal denied, 113 Ill. 303, 515 N.E.2d 112 (1987) 
(discrimination against striking employees, bad faith negotiations); Jensen, 51 Wash . App. 
at 689, 754 P .2d at 1280, 1285 (tortious interference with employment contract on sale of 
business). All of these cases involved motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
132. Barry v. Dymo Graphics Sys ., 394 Mass . 830, 835-36, 478 N.E.2d 707, 711 (1985); 
see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U .S. 85, 105 (1983); infra notes 332 & 335 
and accompanying text. 
133 . Barry, 394 Mass. at 835-36, 478 N.E.2d at 711; accord Barnick v. Longs Drug 
Stores, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 377, 379, 250 Cal. Rptr. 10, 11 (1988) (employee suing 
employer for wrongful discharge to prevent vesting of retirement benefits); Hagler v. J .F. 
Jelenko & Co., 719 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Mo. App. 1986) (employee suing employer for 
severance benefits). Contra Porter v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 189 Ga. App. 818, 820, 377 
S.E .2d 901, 904 (1989) (trial court erred in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because of ERISA preemption); Van De Hey v. United States Nat'! Bank, 90 Or. App . 
258, 262-63, 752 P.2d 848, 850 (1988) (ERISA preemption did not divest state courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction). 
134. Barry, 394 Mass. at 835-36, 478 N.E.2d at 711. 
135. Jd. at 840, 478 N.E .2d at 714. Massachusetts follows the retrial opportunity rule, 
supra note 119. See, e.g., Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 723, 437 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (1982) 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987). 
136. Richland Hosp ., Inc . v. Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d 87 , 88, 516 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 
(1987). 
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lack of jurisdiction and remanded the benefits-due claim for re-
consideration under ERISA rules. 137 
In Soniat v. Travelers Insurance Co., 138 a multipoint opinion, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the fiduciary had not 
waived ERISA preemption. 139 The court also held, however, that 
ERISA did not preempt the state insurance law involved. 140 There-
fore, the result was the same as if the court had recognized the 
waivability of ERISA preemption for the benefits-due lawsuit. 
The Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed preemption 
three times, twice in dicta. In Gorman v. Life Insurance Co. of 
North America, 141 the fiduciaries urged ERISA preemption in 
pretrial motions and objections to evidence at trial, but neglected 
to plead it as an affirmative defense. 142 Following the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Barry, 143 the Texas court stated that 
ERISA preemption related to subject matter jurisdiction and was 
nonwaivable. 144 The court recast the petition as one alleging an 
ERISA action because the fiduciaries had raised ERISA preemption 
before trial. The employee-beneficiary had not submitted proper 
jury instructions under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard, 
and the court entered judgment for the fiduciary. 145 
137. /d. at 93, 516 N.E.2d at 1242 (the trial court had not applied ERISA previously). 
Ohio follows the retrial opportunity rule, supra note 119. See, e.g., Peltz v. City of S. 
Euclid, 11 Ohio St. 2d 128, 132, 228 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1967) . 
138. 538 So. 2d 210 (La. 1989). 
139. /d. at 212-15 . In Soniat, an employee-beneficiary sued an insurer for denying 
coverage for pregnancy benefits under a welfare plan. /d. at 211 . For a discussion of the 
reduced authority of the multipoint opinion see supra note I 07 . 
140. !d. at 212-14. 
141. 752 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted). 
142. /d. at 712-13. In Gorman, an employee-beneficiary sued under a death-benefit plan 
alleging only state causes of action and denied making any claims under ERISA. /d . The 
trial court awarded judgment for the plan. /d. at 713. 
143 . Barry v. Dymo Graphics Sys., Inc., 394 Mass. 830, 835-36, 478 N.E.2d 707, 711 
(1985). See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text. 
144. Gorman, 752 S.W.2d at 713 . 
145. /d. at 712, 714. Texas follows the retrial opportunity rule, supra note 119. See, 
e.g., Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989) (before granting a motion 
to dismiss the trial court is required to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend to 
establish jurisdiction, unless amendment would be useless) . The plaintiff in Gorman, 
however, was alerted to the ERISA cause of action by the fiduciary's pretrial discussions. 
Gorman, 752 S.W.2d at 713. 
In addition, Texas !Ollows the rule that matters not specifically pled cannot be proved. 
See, e.g. , Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Tex. 1982). Because the plaintiff 
effectively refused to amend to plead the ERISA cause of action, the court had no 
alternative other than to construe the petition as if it had stated an ERISA cause of action 
and affirm a judgment which, in essence, dismissed the action for failure to prove an 
ERISA cause of action . Gorman, 752 S.W.2d at 714. 
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In Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 146 the employee-
beneficiary urged that the fiduciaries had waived ERISA preemp-
tion by not pleading it as an affirmative defense although it was 
pled in the answers. 147 Again the court related ERISA preemption 
to subject matter jurisdiction and upheld the summary judgment 
for the fiduciaries on the basis that ERISA preempted the state 
cause of action. 148 
Castillo v. Neely's TBA Dealer Supply, Inc. 149 involved a non-
benefits-due lawsuit. The court noted that its two earlier opinions 
were dicta and retracted its comments on ERISA preemption as 
subject matter jurisdiction. It followed the Fifth and Ninth Circuit 
opinions, 150 deferring to federal court interpretations of federal 
statutes. 151 
2. Waivable 
In contrast to the state courts, the Ninth Circuit, in Gilchrist v. 
Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 152 seized upon the jurisdictional dif-
ference between a benefits-due and a non-benefits-due lawsuit. 
Because the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction of the 
recast ERISA lawsuit, the fiduciary can waive ERISA preemption 
if it was not raised before trial. 153 
The Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court had held 
that NLRA preemption was nonwaivable154 and, in International 
Longshoremen's Association v. Davis,IS5 had determined that be-
cause NLRA preemption involved a choice-of-forum question, as 
the preempting statute specified the NLRB as the exclusive forum, 
it was nonwaivable. 156 
146. 764 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted) . 
147. /d. at 292. 
In Cathey, an employee-beneficiary sued for medical benefits due solely under state 
causes of action and refused to plead ERISA causes of action when directed by the trial 
court. /d. at 289. 
148. /d. at 293. 
149. 776 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
150. /d. at 293. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. 
151. See, e.g., Holmes v. Olson, 587 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex. 1979). 
152. 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). 
153 . /d. at 1496-98. 
In Gilchrist, a terminated employee sued his employer for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing with respect to, among other items, lost medical benefits. 
/d. at 1492. The employee obtained a favorable judgment in trial court. /d. The fiduciary 
raised ERISA preemption initially on appeal. /d. at 1496. 
154. !d. at 1497. 
155. 476 u.s. 380, 391 (1986) . 
156. See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 860 
(1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990). 
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The Supreme Court held that NLRA preemption was not a 
choice-of-law question in which a state court with jurisdiction must 
apply federallaw. 157 From this rule that a choice-of-forum question 
is nonwaivable, the circuit court inferred an inverse rule that a 
litigant may waive preemption when only a choice-of-law question 
is implicated. 158 In Gilchrist, the Ninth Circuit found that ERISA 
preemption involved a choice-of-law question because the federal 
district court would retain jurisdiction even if the suit were recast 
from a state cause of action to an ERISA claim. 159 Because ERISA 
preemption involves only a choice-of-law question, it is waived 
unless raised before trial. 160 
Therefore, the Gilchrist rationale creates another bifurcation of 
ERISA preemption law. Either, in an employee-beneficiary bene-
fits-due lawsuit, preemption is waivable because litigants may bring 
the suit in state or federal court rather than in an exclusive 
forum, 161 or, in a non-benefits-due lawsuit, preemption is not 
waivable because litigants are limited to federal court as an exclu-
sive forum. 162 
The Fifth Circuit has followed the Gilchrist decision twice. 163 In 
Dueringer v. General American Life Insurance Co., 164 the court 
found that the fiduciary had waived ERISA preemption when 
initially raised on appeal because it had not pled preemption as 
an affirmative defense. 165 The court held that litigants must plead 
preemption as an affirmative defense because ERISA preemption 
involves a choice of law .166 In In re HECI Exploration Co. v. 
157. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co . v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55 (1987) (employee-benefit 
action under ERISA must apply federal law and not state law); Local 174, Int'l Bd. of 
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1962) (state court in an action by an 
employee under LMRA must apply federal law and not local law). 
158. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1497. 
159. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
160. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1497. 
161. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
163. HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 1988); Dueringer 
v. General Am. Life Ins . Co., 842 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1988). But see Hayden v. Texas-
U.S. Chern . Co., 681 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1982) (trial court's neglect of ERISA 
preemption, first raised at trial without notice to defendant, resulted in a remand to consider 
the application of ERISA for benefits due under total disability plan). 
164. 842 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988). 
In Dueringer, an insurer under a group medical plan was sued for denying an employee 
coverage. Id. at 130. The fiduciary initially raised preemption unsuccessfully on appeal. 
/d. at 130-31. 
165. Id. at 130. 
166. /d. 
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Holloway, 167 the Fifth Circuit again held that ERISA preemption 
was waived because it involves a choice of law and not a choice 
of forum. 168 The court, however, determined that even if ERISA's 
arbitrary and capricious standard were applied the fiduciary would 
lose. 169 Therefore, the result would have been the same if the court 
had recognized the nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in a 
benefits-due lawsuit. 
Four state courts have decided in a manner consistent with 
Gilchrist: Indiana, 170 Texas, 171 and California appellate courts, 172 
and the Minnesota Supreme Court. 173 All four held that a fiduciary 
who initially raised ERISA preemption after trial or on appeal 
waived it because it relates to a choice of law. 174 
The California court also determined that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish an ERISA plan. 175 If the court had held 
167. 862 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1988). 
In Holloway, an employee-beneficiary sued for benefits due. !d. at 520. The fiduciary 
removed the matter to its bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court neglected to apply 
the arbitrary and capricious standard to determine the employee-beneficiary's right to 
recover against the plan. !d. at 515-16. The fiduciary raised preemption initially on appeal. 
!d. at 517. 
168. !d. at 520. For the reduced authority of the multipoint opinion, see supra note 
107. 
169. Holloway, 862 F .2d at 523-25. 
170. Associates Inv. Co. v. Claeys, 533 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. App . 1989) (without attri-
bution). 
In Claeys, an employee-beneficiary sued for profit-sharing benefits that the fiduciaries 
had wrongly paid to a third party. !d. at 1249. The fiduciaries initially raised ERISA 
preemption in their motion for a new trial (motion to correct errors). !d. at 1250. The 
trial court entered judgment against the fiduciaries. !d. 
171. Great N. Am. Stationers, Inc. v. Ball, 770 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
In Ball, employee-beneficiaries sued for profit-sharing benefits under state law. !d. at 
632. The trial court entered judgment against the fiduciary. !d. The fiduciary raised ERISA 
preemption for the first time on appeal. !d. 
172. Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal . App. 3d 832, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1989), cert. 
dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990). 
In Hughes, an employee-beneficiary sued for denied medical reimbursement. !d. at 852, 
263 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption initially in its appellate 
reply brief. !d. at 848, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60. 
One California court of appeals distinguished Hughes on its facts, however, and consid-
ered ERISA preemption raised for the first time on appeal. Faria v. Northwestern Nat'l 
Life Ins. Co., 216 Cal . App . 3d 1129, 1134 n.2, 265 Cal. Rptr. 309, 312 n.2 (1989) 
(reversing a bad faith insurance processing claim against an employee benefit plan) . 
173 . Hubred v. Control Data Corp ., 442 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1989). 
In Hubred, an employee-beneficiary sued for benefits denied under a health plan. !d. at 
309. The fiduciary obtained a favorable judgment from the trial court, id., but did not 
raise ERISA preemption until the appeal in support of the judgment. !d. at 310 n.l. 
174. Hughes, ~15 Cal. App. 3d at 851 , 263 Cal. Rptr. at 861; Claeys, 533 N.E .2d at 
1252; Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 310 n.l ; Ball, 770 S.W.2d at 632. 
175. Hughes, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 857-59, 263 Cal. Rptr . at 865-67. For the reduced 
authority of the multipoint opinion see supra note 107. 
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ERISA preemption nonwaivable, the fiduciary would have lost 
because it failed to prove that the plan was an ERISA plan. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court cited an LMRA case176 and a 
non-benefits-due decision. 177 Because LMRA does not have a stat-
utory preemption provision, 178 LMRA waivability arises from dif-
ferent principles than the waivability of ERISA's express preemption 
provision. 179 Under currently recognized principles, the waivability 
in a non-benefits-due lawsuit differs from the waivability of a 
benefits-due lawsuit in that jurisdiction lies in federal court, an 
exclusive forum, and not both in federal and state court. 180 The 
fiduciary won under state law, 181 and the result would have been 
the same if the court had recognized the nonwaivability of ERISA 
preemption for a benefits-due lawsuit. 
Although these state courts speak to ERISA preemption's waiv-
ability, their determinations do not constitute an independent 
confirmation of the federal decisions arriving at the same conclu-
sion. Through case law, many states provide that decisions of 
federal courts on federal law bind state courts. 182 Therefore, these 
state courts recognized the Ninth Circuit's holding in Gilchrist as 
binding. 
III. THE PREEMPTION PRINCIPLE 
In International Longshoremen's Association v. Davis, 183 an 
NLRA preemption case, the Supreme Court reemphasized that 
176. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 310 n.10 (citing Johnson v. Armored Transport of Cal., 
Inc., 813 F.2d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
The authority of Johnson is doubtful because its waivability conclusion is based on an 
ERISA case, Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986), 
which does not recognize the differences between LMRA, which lacks a statutory preemption 
provision, and ERISA, which does have a statutory preemption provision. See supra notes 
38-48 and accompanying text. 
177. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 310 n.1 (citing Amalgamated Cotton Garment & Allied 
Indus. Fund v. Dion, 341 Pa. Super. 12, 15, 491 A.2d 123, 124 (1985)). 
178. See Allis-Chalmers Corp . v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). 
179. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text . 
180. See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text . 
181. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 312. For the reduced authority of a multipoint opinion 
see supra note 107. 
182. See, e.g., Voelkel v. Tohulka, 236 Ind. 588, 594, 141 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1957), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 891 (National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940); Propper v. 
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 237 Minn. 386, 394, 54 N.W.2d 840, 846 (1952) (Federal 
Employers' Liability Act); Holmes v. Olson, 587 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex. 1979) (Truth in 
Lending Act). But see People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 87, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 457, 460 (1969) (lower federal courts are not binding on federal questions, only 
persuasive). 
183 . 476 U.S. 380 (1986); see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
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courts should use congressional intent to resolve federal preemption 
disputes. The Supreme Court had discussed NLRA preemption in 
an earlier case disputing an injunction granted under a state 
statute. 184 The Court determined that NLRA preemption was ju-
risdictional because the NLRB was the exclusive forum which 
extinguished state jurisdiction and left the state court without 
subject matter jurisdiction. 185 In dicta, the Court noted that NLRA 
preemption did not involve a choice of law, as did a claim under 
Section 301 of LMRA, 186 but it made no statement concerning 
nonwaivability of LMRA preemption. 187 
Davis is the source of the choice-of-forum/choice-of-law dis-
tinction in ERISA preemption decisions. In Davis, however, the 
Supreme Court also held that this distinction resulted from con-
gressional intent for the NLRA as delineated in the Supreme 
Court's prior opinions. 188 The Court limited its decision to those 
preemption claims that went to a state's actual adjudicatory power. 189 
The Supreme Court was not deciding nonwaivability for other 
types of preemption. In fact, the Supreme Court went on to state 
that preemption under any other statute rested on the congressional 
intent in enacting that statute. 190 Therefore, the Davis holding does 
not resolve preemption issues outside of a state's adjudicatory 
power or under a statutory preemption provision. 
In Davis, a stevedoring company fired a salaried supervisor for trying to unionize the 
longshoremen. !d. at 382, 384. The union allegedly had told the supervisor that, if his 
employer fired him, they would get his job back with back pay. !d. Legal precedent, 
however, indicated that it is not an unfair labor practice to fire supervisors for union 
activity. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 417 
U.S . 790, 812 (1974). The supervisor then sued the union for fraud and misrepresentation 
in Alabama state court. Davis, 476 U.S. at 386. The union defended under state law, not 
raising NLRA preemption until its motion for judgment-notwithstanding-the-verdict. Id. 
The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that the union had waived NLRA preemption because Alabama law required 
defendants affirmatively to plead federal preemption. !d. at 386-87. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the Alabama court had erred in deciding the case on this basis, 
but affirmed on other grounds. !d. at 399-400. 
184. See Local No. 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548 
(1963), cited in Davis, 476 U.S. at 390. 
185. Davis, 476 U.S. at 392. 
186. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988); see infra note 310 and accompanying text. 
187. Davis, 476 U.S. at 391; see Curry, 371 U.S. at 548; Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (an employer sought damages under 
state Jaw as a result of a union striking in violation of a collective bargaining agreement) . 
188. Davis, 476 U.S. at 392 n.9. 
189. !d. 
190. !d. 
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Courts subsequently applying Davis to other statutes have not 
followed this clear direction191 or examined the congressional intent 
for the statute. 192 Instead, courts have developed elaborate tests 
for the choice-of-forum/choice-of-law distinction. One court out-
lined three types of preemption: one for choice of law in a case 
properly before a state or federal court; one for claims such as 
the LMRA Section 301 lawsuit, which does not involve jurisdiction; 
and one for the choice of forum. 193 
Other than for implicit NLRA preemption, courts have used 
Davis primarily as the basis for implicit preemption under LMRA 
and explicit preemption under ERISA. 194 Several courts that con-
sidered LMRA preemption did not reach the waiver issue because 
preemption was raised at the trial level, 195 and one court found no 
191. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
192. New York's highest court examined legislative intent prior to Davis, 476 U.S. at 
391. See Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 28, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1985); see 
also Note, Preemption or Preservation of State Remedies under ERISA? The New York 
Court of Appeals Preserves a State Remedy in Sasso v. Vachris, 60 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 
567' 578-79 (1986). 
193. See Miller v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 834 F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1987). 
194. See supra notes 17 & 37 and accompanying text. 
Courts have also considered the impact of International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 
476 U.S. 380 (1986), on preemption under four other statutes without the waiver issue 
before them. Under the Railway Labor Act, Pub . L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat . 577 (1926) 
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-86 (1988)), federal preemption arose in two 
district courts after removal from state court. Therefore, the litigants did not need to raise 
the waiver issue. See Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburg & L.E.R.R., 858 F.2d 
936, 943 (3d Cir. 1988) (because state action not found to encompass a federal cause of 
action, federal court lacked jurisdiction under removal statute); Miller v. Norfolk & W. 
Ry., 834 F .2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1987) (trial court did not resolve preemption question; 
case remanded for determination). 
Under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1988)), in a case without removal 
jurisdiction, the court suggested that the petitioner should have argued preemption. See 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986). In a case under 
the Federal Boat Safety Act, Pub . L. No. 92-75, 85 Stat. 213 (1971) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1451-89 (1988)) (with an express preemption provision), the Wisconsin 
state court dealt with preemption which was raised for the first time in a postverdict motion 
and treated it as if it related to subject matter jurisdiction, but found no preemption and 
avoided the waiver issue. Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 146 Wis. 2d 604, 626, 432 
N.W.2d 130, 139 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). 
195. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F .2d 1098, 
1108 (6th Cir. 1986) (trustees suing for employer contributions to pension plan), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); Teamsters Local No. 429 Health & Welfare Fund v. Chain 
Bike Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1337, 1341-43 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (trustees sued for employer 
contribution to welfare plan both under LMRA and ERISA; court used the express language 
of ERISA, 29 U .S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (1985)); Sargent v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 167 Mich. 
App. 29, 33, 421 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1988) (wrongful discharge). 
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preemption and, therefore, did not consider the waiver issue. 196 
When LMRA preemption was raised initially after trial or on 
appeal, the courts discussed neither the meaning of LMRA pre-
emption nor its legislative intent. In an ERISA preemption case, 197 
the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant had waived LMRA 
preemption198 without citing any difference between ERISA's ex-
press preemption provision and LMRA's implied preemption. On 
the basis of NLRA cases, the Alabama· Supreme Court found that 
the fiduciary had not waived LMRA preemption. 199 That case also 
failed to note the jurisdictional differences between the two sta-
tutes. Because the Alabama court refused to recast the lawsuit as 
an LMRA action, the plaintiff's claim consisted only of state 
causes of action preempted by LMRA, and, therefore, the plaintiff 
could not invoke the state court's subject matter jurisdiction. An 
Illinois appellate court reached the same result based on a pre-
Davis Seventh Circuit opinion. 200 
Like the LMRA cases relying on Davis, ERISA preemption cases 
have not reached the waiver issue because the defendant had raised 
the matter at trial.2°1 Several other courts, however, have dealt 
with ERISA preemption raised initially on appeal. Instead of 
exploring the legislative intent behind ERISA, these courts have 
created a rule converse to the Supreme Court's NLRA rule, holding 
that if the preemption merely involves a choice of law, the litigant 
may waive it. 202 
196. National Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) 
(employee sued for intentional tort of not assigning light duty for injured back). 
197. Johnson v. Armored Transport of Cal. Inc., 813 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(employee sued for wrongful discharge). 
198. /d. at 1043-44. 
The Johnson court determined that LMRA preemption was similar to the ERISA 
preemption considered in Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc. , 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th 
Cir. 1986). Both cases held that the fiduciary had waived preemption that was initially 
raised in post-trial motions. 
199. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays, 516 So. 2d 517, 518 (Ala. 1987) (retaliatory discharge 
and defamation; state court was without jurisdiction), vacated, 486 U.S. 1050 (1988). 
200. Sagen v. Jewel Cos., 148 Ill. App. 3d 447, 450, 499 N.E.2d 662, 664 (1986) (citing 
National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986) (tortious interference with 
employment contract, a collective bargaining agreement; raised for first time on appeal in 
supplemental brief)). 
201. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 764 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) 
(writ granted) (preemption raised in answers); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 710, 
713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted) (preemption raised in pretrial discussions). 
202. Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Hughes v. Blue Cross, 199 Cal. App. 3d 958, 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1988), reconsidered, 215 
Cal. App. 3d 832, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); 
Associates Inv. Co. v. Claeys, 533 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Great N. Am. 
Stationers v. Ball, 770 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
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The failure to examine the congressional intent of the express 
ERISA preemption provision compounds the error of these appel-
late courts when they apply Davis. The Davis case dealt with an 
implicit preemption for which the courts will accommodate state 
law. 203 Because ERISA preemption is an express preemption, the 
courts can prevent encroachment by state law. 204 Therefore, a 
holding on an implicit preemption is not necessarily relevant to an 
express preemption. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
To determine whether ERISA preemption is jurisdictional, the 
courts must first examine ERISA's express preemption provision 
in light of preventing encroachment by state laws and promoting 
uniformity. 205 Courts will normally inquire into legislative intent 
to determine statutory meaning. 206 To achieve a just result, a court 
uses different principles depending on the circumstances of the 
case.207 In statutory construction, courts employ two techniques: 
the analytical or plain-meaning method, acting on the literal mean-
ing of the words in the statute, and the teleological method, acting 
on the intended legislative remedy. 208 
In applying the analytical method, courts use only the statute 
itself and intrinsic aids such as section headings, preambles, titles, 
punctuation, context, grammar, and word choice. 209 :rhis method 
203 . See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
205. See infra notes 344-64 and accompanying text. 
206. See, e.g. , United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 55 
(1942) (the all-important controlling factor in determining the meaning of a statute is 
legislative intent); United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 239 (1927) (same); 
Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925) (same); Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Forsyth, 159 
U.S. 46, 55 (1895) (same); Jones v. New York Guar. & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 626 
(1879) (legislative intent is the law); Indianapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 
(1876) (same); Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 715 (1875) (same); United States v. 
Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 3% (1867) (same); see also United States v. Cooper Corp., 
312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941) (role of the court is to declare the legislative intent); United States 
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 610, 630 (1818) (same). 
207. SeeK. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960). See generally R. 
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 60-85 (1983) (discussing principles and 
counterprinciples in contract law, such as the freedom to contract and fairness). 
208 . S. SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 86 (1973). The key differ-
ence between the two methods is the use of legislative history to interpret statutes. 
209. See generally C. NUTTING, S. ELLIOT, & R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATION CASES AND 
MATERIALS 471-508 (4th ed. 1969) [hereinafter C. NuTTING]. English courts have a definite 
preference for the analytical method and eschew the use of extrinsic aids such as historical 
legislative material. See Vacher & Sons, Ltd. v. London Soc'y of Compositors, [1913] App. 
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determines not what the legislators meant to say, but the meaning 
of what they did say.210 Under the analytical method, the court 
determines a statute's meaning through its exact language, using 
intrinsic aids only if necessary. 211 A court must enforce the statute 
as written, even if the literal construction leads to unjust results.212 
Courts frequently weaken this method by combining it with the 
teleological method. They create an ambiguous language exception 
to the plain-meaning rule under which the court considers extrinsic 
aids in addition to intrinsic aids.213 
Under the teleological method, courts use external aids, such as 
other statutes, prior judicial and administrative decisions, historical 
context, and legislative history. 214 In contrast to the analytical 
method, a court examines the problem that the legislature set out 
Cas. 107, 121-22. Two facets of the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary 
explain the English courts' preference for the analytical method. See G. MARSHALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 74 (1971). First, the supremacy of Parliament over the other 
branches of government encourages a belief in the sanctity of the exact words of the 
statute. See Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388, 406-07 (1942). 
Second, four aspects of the legislative process discourage a search for the legislative intent: 
(I) a joint statutory effort of two legislative houses and the Crown obscures ascertaining 
any single intent from the historical document, see G. MARSHALL, supra, at 74-75; (2) the 
· number of participants involved in the statute's passage renders valueless any single 
member's opinion concerning the meaning, see Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 
12 HARv. L. REv . 417 (1899); (3) statements of the civil servant drafters contain bias, see 
G. MARSHALL, supra, at 76; and (4) because a statute frequently results from compromise, 
the legislators often confuse their intention with the language actually employed . See Hilder 
v. Dexter, [1902] App . Cas. 474, 477 (Earl of Halsbury). 
210. Dockers' Labour Club & Inst. Ltd. v. Race Relations Bd., [1974] 3 All E .R. 592, 
600 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale) . 
211. See, e.g., F. HORAK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 271-76 (1940); C. 
NUTTING, supra note 209, at 408 . 
212. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 521 (1981) (concerning 
ERISA preemption "[o]ur judicial function is not to second-guess the policy decisions of 
the legislature, no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales."); F. HoRAK, 
supra note 211, at 271-76 and 1059; C. NuTTING, supra note 209, at 408; see also Hill v. 
East & W. India Dock Co., 9 App. Cas. 448, 465 (1884) (Lord Bramwell) . English courts 
follow this attitude even when facing ambiguous words. Commonwealth of Australia v. 
Bank of New S. Wales, [1950] App. Cas. 235, 307. 
213. See, e.g., F. HoRAK, supranote 211, at 271-76; C. NuTTING, supra note 209, at 
408. 
214. F. HoRAK, supra note 211, at 508-56. France, the United States, and the inter-
national community follow this latter approach. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/ Conf. 39/ 27; M. PLANIOL, I TRAITE ELEMENTALRE 
DE DROIT CIVIL 86 (1925); Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or 
What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J . 535, 537-38 (1948) . 
In stark contrast, English common law forbids the courts to use the bill introducing the 
act, Herron v. Rathmines & Rathgar Improvement Comm'rs, [1892] App . Cas. 498, 502; 
speeches and debates on the bill or the fate of committee amendments, Warner v. 
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to solve and the remedy it developed and then construes the statute 
in light of achieving those ends.215 This principle permits judges 
to interpret statutes in a variety of ways.216 Some courts treat this 
method as an additional exception to the analytical method to 
prevent unjust or absurd results.217 The United States Supreme 
Court has used both methods.218 
In the case of ERISA's preemption and jurisdictional provisions, 
both methods lead to the same conclusion. 
A. Intrinsic Aids 
Regardless of the method used, the court's analysis ordinarily 
starts with the statute itself following well-established canons of 
statutory construction. 219 The analytical method is limited to these 
canons. Unfortunately, use of only the canons is frequently not 
Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1969) 2 App. Cas. 256, 279, [1968) 2 All E.R. 356, 367; 
reports of Royal commissions or government committees, Black-Clawson Int'l Ltd. v. 
Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G., [1975] App. Cas. 591, 615 [1975) 1 All E.R. 
810, 815; the views of an administrative body concerned with administering the act, London 
City Council v. Central Land Bd., [1959] Ch. 386, 392, [1958) 3 All E.R. 676, 678 or 
views of the draftsman, Hilder v. Dexter, [1902) App. Cas. 475, 477. 
215 . See, e.g., F. HoRAK, supra note 211, at 268-71, 1059; C. NUTTING, supra note 
209, at 408-09. The teleological method derives from Heydon's Case, 3 Co . Rep. 7a, 7b, 
76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584) (Sir Edward Coke) . 
216. See C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 261-62 (1956) (King James l's statements 
about Sir Edward Coke's idea concerning statutory interpretation by judges); see also 
Magor & St. Mellons Rural Dist. Council v. Newport Corp., [1952] App. Cas. 189, 191 
(Lord Denning's approach of filling in the gaps and making sense of the statute by 
supplementing the written word by considering the legislative and ministerial intent criticized 
as "a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin guise of interpretation"). 
217. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
218. Compare Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443, 446 (1924) (if the language is plain 
and an injustice arises, the remedy lies with Congress and not the courts) and Caminetti 
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (if the language is plain and unambiguous, the 
duty of interpretation does not arise and the court need not discuss the aids for resolving 
ambiguity) with Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459 (statutes should be sensibly 
construed so that the reason of the law prevails over its letter if an injustice or absurdity 
would result) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 560 (1967) (teleological method; suggesting 
Sir Edward Coke's rule in Heydon's Case). 
219. See, e.g., Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 307 (1938) . Even the canons have 
principles and counter principles. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 521-35. As a 
result, a declaration of the legislative intent can overcome a canon of construction. See, 
e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336 (1981) (the starting point for interpreting 
a statute is the language of the statute itself; "[a)bsent a clearly expressed legislative 
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive"); 
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S . (2 Pet.) 627, 661 (1829) (technical rule must yield to the 
expression of the will of the legislature); Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall .) 365, 367 (1797) 
(same). 
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determinative because different canons occasionally provide con-
flicting results, 220 and due to the lack of a hierarchy among the 
canons, 221 judges frequently speculate on legislative intent when 
selecting the proper canon. 222 
220. See Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REv. 431, 
443 (1989). 
The English Race Relations Act of 1968 (RRA), ch. 71, repealed by the Race Relations 
Act of 1976, ch. 74, § 79, provides an example of this conflict . (An English statute is 
preferable for this purpose because the English court uses the analytical method more 
strenuously than American courts.) The first RRA case to reach the House of Lords dealt 
with whether the act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "national origin" included 
discrimination on the basis of changeable national citizenship. London Borough of Ealing 
v. Race Relation Bd., [1972] App. Cas . 342, [1972) 1 All E.R. 105 (1971), rev'g [1971) 
Q.B. 309, [1970) 1 All E.R. 424. 
One canon presumes that a specific proviso excludes unmentioned situations from the 
act that otherwise would come within its scope. See Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey, 5 
Q.B.D. 170, 173 (1880). Because the RRA has two sections exempting some discrimination 
on nationality grounds, RRA, §§ 8(11), 27(9), the term "national origin" would include 
"nationality." See Eating, [1971] I All E.R. at 435 . 
Another canon requires interpreting statutes that limit common-law freedoms narrowly 
in favor of the freedom. In re Cuno, 43 Ch . D. 12, 17 (1889). Because race discrimination 
was lawful prior to the RRA, the term "national origin" would be limited to citizenship 
by birth. Eating, [1971) I All E .R. at 435 (Swanwick, J., noting the conflict and the 
absence of direction on which governs). 
221. See Posner, supra note 220, at 443 . 
The RRA again provides an example. In the ex abundanti cautela canon the court 
presumes that the legislature included an exception clause to prevent an incident related to 
the enacting clause from escaping the judges' notice. See Wakefield Local Bd. of Health 
v. West Riding & Grimsby Ry., L.R. I Q.B. 84, 85 (1865). The excepting proviso of the 
RRA also provides an exception for residence, which lies without the ambit of the RRA. 
RRA, §§ 1(1), 27(9)(a). The RRA's excepting proviso expressed the draftsman's cautiousness 
by including more in the saving clause than is absolutely necessary. Eating, [1972] I All 
E.R. at 109 (Lord Donovan), 112 (Viscount Dilhorne), 115 (Lord Simon), 118 (Lord Cross). 
222. See Posner, supra note 220, at 443 (no one has suggested a satisfactory ordering 
of the canons). 
With respect to the RRA, Viscount Dilhorne confirmed his interpretation by speculating 
that if Parliament had intended to include nationality within the discrimination definition 
it could have easily added the words "or nationality" after "national origins." Eating, 
[1972) I All E.R. at 113. This approach overlooks the possibility that members of Parliament 
thought "national origins" included "nationality," making the addition superfluous. Lord 
Cross also confirmed his interpretation by speculating that Parliament used "national 
origins" and not "nationality" because nationality based on citizenship did not include 
British subjects against whom violators practiced discrimination, whereas national origins 
based on birth did. !d. at 117. This interpretation overlooks the possibility that "colour, 
race or ethnic ... origins" includes the type of discrimination Lord Cross had in mind . 
At best, these canons provide a checklist for the judge to consult before determining the 
meaning of a statilte. Posner, supra note 220, at 443. One such checklist was prepared by 
Professor Llewellyn. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 522-25. 
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1. Statutory Language 
The only statutory language the courts should need to construe 
lies in the ERISA preemption provision, Section 514: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of 
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any 
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not 
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. 223 
Some courts, however, have also felt a need to examine the ERISA 
jurisdictional provision, Section 502(e),224 which provides that non-
benefits-due actions must be brought in federal court and benefits-
due actions may be brought in either federal or state court. 225 Only 
those courts that fail to distinguish between implicit and express 
preemption have given significance to the jurisdictional provision. 
These courts have used the jurisdictional provision to create a 
choice-of-law preemption, which only relates to implicit preemp-
tion. 
2. Plain Meaning 
The Supreme Court primarily applies the plain-meaning rule: in 
the absence of ambiguity in a statute's wording, the statute's 
explicit terms express the legislative intent. 226 Ambiguity is an 
223 . 29 U.S.C . § 1144(a) (1985 & Supp. 1987). 
The saving clause exceptions in § 1144(b) generally apply to: pre-ERISA matters; state 
regulation of insurance, banking, and securities; the use of state facilities by the Department 
of Labor; criminal laws of general applicability; the Hawaiian Prepaid Health Care Act; 
fully-insured, multiple welfare arrangements; qualified domestic relation orders; and non-
exclusion of welfare plan coverage due to social security coverage. 
The exemptions in § 1003(b) generally relate to: governmental plans; most church plans; 
plans maintained only to comply with applicable worker's compensation laws; plans 
maintained outside the United States primarily to benefit nonresident aliens; and unfunded, 
excess-benefit plans . 
224. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988). 
225 . Section 502(e) states: 
/d. 
Except for actions under subsection (a)(l )(B) of this section, the district courts 
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this 
subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. 
State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States 
shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under subsection (a)(I)(B) of this 
section. 
226. See, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (stating the analytical 
construction principle); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, Ill S. Ct. 478, 482-83 
(1990) (applying the plain-meaning rule to the ERISA preemption provision); FMC Corp. 
v. Holliday, IllS. Ct. 403, 407 (1990) (same); Pilot Life Ins . Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 
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imprecise word that can permit a court to use the extrinsic aids 
when it chooses.227 The discussion in this subsection assumes the 
absence of any ambiguity or use of extrinsic aids. 
A court should begin by examining the plain meaning of the 
wording of ERISA's express preemption. Under the plain-meaning 
canon, the words are given their commonly attributed meaning. 228 
The plain meaning is usually obtained from the contemporary 
edition of a respected dictionary, for example, Black's Law Dic-
tionary or Webster's New International Dictionary.229 
41 , 50 (1987) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co . v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) 
(applying the plain-meaning rule to the savings clause of the ERISA preemption provision); 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S . 85 , 97 (1983) (same); United States v. Turkette, 
452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (if the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a 
clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded 
as conclusive); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 , 484 (1981) (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 
U.S. I, 7 (1980) (ordinarily it is not necessary to look beyond the words of a statute, into 
the legislative history, in order to ascertain the meaning of a statute); United States v. 
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S . 115, 122 (1980) (absent clear evidence of a contrary legislative 
intention, a statute should be interpreted according to its plain language). But see Train v. 
Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. I, 9-10 (1976) (courts should consider 
legislative history even if the language of the statute is clear). See generally Murphy, Old 
Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Mod-
ern" Federal Courts, 75 CowM. L. REv. 1299 {1975) (analyzing cases in which the Supreme 
Court only appeared to give weight to the rule and other cases where federal courts followed 
Caminetti, 242 U.S. 470, in its full rigor). 
For criticism of the plain-meaning rule see Posner, supra note 220, at 442 (the rule is 
unnecessary; competent judges do not need grammar handbooks, incompetent judges are 
unable to apply them). See generally Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning 
Rule, 4 DAY. L. REv. 31 (1979) . 
227. See White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 7, 
21 (reconciling Karl Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code with Legal Realism by inten-
tionally using the imprecise words "unconscionable" and " good faith " to allow judges to 
derive an equitable result without torturing an accepted rule of law). 
228. See, e.g. , Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983) (when a statute does 
not define a term, /the court must start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is 
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
182 (1981) (in cases of statutory construction, begin with the language of the statute, and, 
unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted according to their ordinary, contem-
porary, common meaning); see also Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524 (1947); 
Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658 (1944); Western Union Tel. Co . v. Lenroot, 323 
U.S . 490 (1944); Levy v. M'Cartee, 31 U.S. (6. Pet .) 102 (1932); cf. UNIF. STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION AcT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 513 (1980). 
229. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S . 16, 21 (1983) (using WEBSTER's 
THnlD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. !981) (hereinafter WEBSTER'S 3d), RANDOM 
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979), and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th 
ed. 1979)); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.l6 (1983) (using BLACK's LAw 
DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) for the ERISA preemptive provision). 
The Supreme Court has indicated that a court should not apply a dictionary mechanically 
in unintended contexts, but only when using the teleological method. See Farmers Reservoir 
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The key terms in the ERISA preemption provision are: the 
introductory proviso, 230 "shall," "supersede," "State laws," "in-
sofar," "relate to," and "employee benefit plans." Because the 
introdu~tory proviso and the phrases "State laws," "relate to," 
and "employee benefit plan" concern substantive law, they are 
less important for dealing with the procedural aspects of state law 
survivability. Moreover, the statute defines two of these terms,231 
and the Supreme Court has initiated the investigation of the other 
two. 232 
"Shall" indicates a mandatory requirement.233 "Supersede" com-
monly means: "(2) to make void or useless ... by superior power 
... ; to cause to be set aside; to force out of use ... ; to render 
obsolete; to cause to be abandoned. (3) to take the place ... of; 
to replace. (4) to displace . . . or make way for another. " 234 
& Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 764 (1948) (citing Hand, J., using the 
teleological method, in Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 326 
u .s. 404 (1945)) . 
The Third Circuit has advocated that Congress intended the dictionary meaning when 
drafting the ERISA preemption provision. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F .2d 
1238, 1250 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724, 740 (1985) (giving the ERISA preemption provision its "broad common-sense mean-
ing"); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983) (relying on legislative 
history and the "normal sense of the phrase" to interpret the ERISA preemption provision). 
230. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) ("Except as provided in subsection(b) ... )". 
231. /d. §§ 1002(3), 1144(c)(l) (employee benefit plan, state laws) . One statutory 
construction canon binds courts to use definitions and rules of interpretation contained in 
the statute. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 523 (Canon no. 9). 
232 . The Supreme Court has determined that "relates to" means "has a connection to 
or reference to." See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (using BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 229; see also Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv. Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) 
(Georgia garnishment law does not relate to a welfare plan); Fort Halifax Packing Co., 
Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. I (1987) (Maine severance pay statute does not relate); Pilot Life 
Ins. Co . v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (Mississippi bad-faith claims-processing does 
relate); Metropolitan Life Ins., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (Massachusetts statute requiring 
minimum health care relates); cf. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) 
(New Jersey worker's compensation statute prohibiting benefit offset relates). 
The Supreme Court has also determined that certain laws regulate insurance within the 
introductory proviso. See Pilot Life Ins. , 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (Mississippi bad-faith claims-
processing not saved from preemption); Metropolitan Life Ins., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) 
(Massachusetts statute requiring minimum health care saved). 
233. See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1934); United States ex rei. Siegel 
v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353, 359-60 (1895). Contra West Wis. Ry. v. Foley, 94 U.S. 100 
(1876) (only in relation to other parts of the statute) . 
Another statutory construction canon requires courts to use definitions determined prior 
to the statute's passage. K . LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 524 (Canon no. 13). 
234. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2533 (2d ed. 1951) (hereinafter WEBS-
TER'S 2d]; see also WEBSTER's 3d, supra note 229, at 2295. 
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"Insofar" commonly means "to such an extent or degree. " 235 This 
straight-forward reasoning indicates that ERISA has eliminated 
state law to the extent that "it relate[s] to any employee benefit 
plan.' ' 236 Therefore, because this area of substantive state law no 
longer exists, it cannot give a court jurisdiction. 
The Ninth Circuit's construction of this section in Gilchrist237 
conflicts with the ERISA preemption provision's plain meaning. 
Although the plain meaning eliminates all state law, the court 
would permit substantive state law to apply in some benefits-due 
lawsuits. The conflict arises from the Ninth Circuit's treatment of 
ERISA's express preemption as an implicit preemption. In Davis, 
the Supreme Court created NLRA preemption on the basis of an 
implied legislative intent, not on a judicially-perceived conflict 
between state and federal labor law. If the Court had created 
ERISA preemption in this manner, the courts might be free to 
determine ERISA preemption's limits. 238 Instead, Congress created 
ERISA preemption by express statutory language. Therefore, courts 
should act to prevent state law encroachment on ERISA's uniform 
federal common law rather than accommodate the least possible 
displacement of state law. 
The legislative intent expressed in the language of this statute 
should not lead to a split between lawsuits brought in federal and 
state courts or between non-benefits-due and benefits-due law-
suits. 239 Under the plain-meaning rule, ERISA preempts all state 
laws at all times. Nowhere does the statute suggest a distinction 
based on the type of lawsuit or the forum. 
Another statutory construction canon suggests that a court can-
not construe ERISA to preempt state law only when the litigants 
do not waive preemption in a particular type of lawsuit or forum. 
The canon, contrary to the plain-meaning rule, provides an excep-
tion to plain meaning when the literal interpretation leads to 
absurdities, "mischievous consequences," or thwarts the statute's 
purpose.240 For ERISA preemption, however, it is not the plain-
meaning result that leads to absurd results but the waiver concept. 
235. WEBSTER's 3d, supra note 229, at 1170; WEBSTER's 2d, supra note 234, at 1286. 
236. This is clearly the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the meaning of "supersede." 
See City of Los Angeles v. Gurdane, 59 F.2d 161, 163 (9th Cir. 1932) ("supersede" in a 
statute means " '[s]et aside;' 'annul;' 'displace;' 'make void, inefficacious, or useless;' 
'repeal' " or that "there is not much left of the existing"). 
237. Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). 
238. Cf. J.l. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (court to determine extent and 
nature of implied action for proxy violation from federal policy underlying statute) . 
239. See supra notes 36, 54 & 101 and accompanying text. 
240. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 524 (Canon no. 12). 
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It is far easier for courts to apply a uniform rule that is applicable 
to all ERISA actions than to first analyze the type of lawsuit or 
available forum. The latter approach creates multiple bodies of 
employee benefit law, one for nonwaiver and several for waiver 
of ERISA preemption. This bifurcation undermines the preemption 
provision's purpose of encouraging the growth of private-employer, 
employee-benefit plans through uniformity of law. 241 
Permitting waiver of preemption also violates several other stat-
utory construction canons. The waiver situation effectively creates 
a new implied proviso for Section 514 of ERISA. One canon 
requires a court to construe a proviso narrowly to exclude any 
situation that is not contained in the specific wording.242 Another 
canon forbids a court to read an exception like waiver into the 
statute.243 Under yet another canon, the express statement of a 
proviso excludes the creation of a new proviso. 244 Still another 
canon requires the court to give meaning to every word in the 
statute. 245 This does not, however, authorize a court to create a 
waiver exception through the jurisdiction provision because as that 
provision merely designates jurisdiction for lawsuits arising under 
ERISA. 
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(2) (1988) (purpose of the multiemployer plan amendments 
to ERISA is to prevent discouraging their growth); see also id. § 1001(a) (congressional 
findings that employee-benefit plans are important to the security of millions of Americans, 
to the stability of labor, and to the continuity of interstate commerce suggest a purpose 
to foster the growth of those plans); cf. infra notes 345-47 and accompanying text (growth 
purpose also evidenced extrinsically) . 
242. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 528 (Canon no . 28); cf. inf ra note 332 (ERISA 
extrinsic evidence indicates a court should construe the exceptions narrowly). The counter 
canon provides an equitable exception, but waiver does not treat the "waiving" party 
equitably. The nonwaiver situation is far less inequitable because the losing litigant may 
retry the case under ERISA. See, e.g. , supra notes 119, 122, 135, 137 & 145. The only 
potential inequity is additional litigation costs. The plaintiff, however, created those costs 
attempting to avoid ERISA, and the defendant is generally the beneficiary of nonwaiver . 
243. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 526 (Canon no . 19). 
Under ERISA, courts generally have not followed this canon. For example, when 
considering preemption of marital property law, courts have found an implied exception 
or irrebuttable presumption against preemption. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Merry, 592 F .2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment for alimony and support); Stone v. 
Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N .D. Cal. 1928), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir . 1980), cert. 
denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981) (community property laws); see also Kilberg & Inman, supra 
note 39, at 1320-21. 
Congress finally resolved this problem in the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub . L. 
No . 93-397, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36 (1984), creating an express provision for qualified 
domestic relations orders and clarifying the preemption in other family law areas. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1056 (1988). 
244. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 526 (Canon no. 20) . 
245 . !d. at 525 (Canon no. 16). 
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Therefore, any state or federal court that relies solely on state 
law for jurisdiction when reviewing a claim that "relate[s] to any 
employee benefit plan," will lack subject matter jurisdiction be-
cause ERISA supersedes that state law. The only way a state court 
could obtain subject matter jurisdiction would be if the plaintiff 
amended the petition to include the appropriate ERISA action, 
which would invoke ERISA's jurisdictional provision. The effect 
of holding that ERISA preemption can be waived is either: (1) to 
recognize ERISA for purposes of asserting jurisdiction, then deny 
its existence for purposes of conducting the lawsuit; 246 or (2) to 
interpret the jurisdictional provision as an exception to the pre-
emption provision although the language of the preemption pro-
vision explicitly excludes exceptions. 247 Neither method is condoned 
by the Supreme Court. 
B. Extrinsic Aids 
Under the plain-meaning method, a court must find an ambiguity 
in the words of the statute before it can examine extrinsic aids to 
interpretation. 248 Under the teleological method, the explicit words 
are not a barrier to the examination of extrinsic aids.249 
Commentators have suggested several ambiguities in ERISA. For 
example, the key word in the preemption provision, "supersede," 
is ambiguous because a court could interpret it narrowly or 
broadly.250 The narrow interpretation would limit the effect to only 
those statutes that actually conflict with ERISA. 251 Conversely, the 
246. This idea runs counter to the procedure for cases tried on the wrong theory. See, 
e.g., supra notes 119, 122, 135, 137 & 145 . 
247 . See supra note 243. 
248 . See supra note 213 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has adopted this 
rule with respect to legislative history, the primary extrinsic aid discussed in this Article. 
See, e.g., Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937) (legislative history cannot 
compel a construction at variance with the plain words of the statute); Fairport, P . & 
E.R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934) (if the statute is unambiguous, consideration of 
legislative history is not permissible); Wilbur v. United States, 284 U.S. 231 (1931) (same). 
249. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
250. See Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 
62 IowA L. REv. 57, 67 (1976) (suggesting "supersede" is narrower than "preempt"); 
Manno, supra note 10, at 60 (describing the two meanings the same as for court-implied 
preemption; see supra notes 39 & 40). 
251. See Brummond, supra note 250. One court rejected the narrow interpretation, 
deciding that "supersede" in § 514 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988), means 
"preempt" . Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287, 1302 (2d Cir. 1981), 
modified sub nom., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) . 
The Supreme Court chose this narrow approach when it first defined "relate to," but it 
later moved to a broad interpretation. Compare Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 
U.S. 504 (1981) with Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
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broad interpretation would eliminate a whole statute that only 
tangentially touched on ERISA. 252 Another ambiguity exists be-
cause "insofar as" implies that preemption applies only to the 
application of the state law, but "relate to" implies preemption 
of the state law itself.253 In addition, a court could interpret "relate 
to" broadly to eliminate state laws that regulate areas traditionally 
left to state governance if such laws impose substantive require-
ments on an ERISA plan; or it could interpret "relate to" narrowly 
which could permit states to impose requirements on plans under 
the guise of regulating other matters. 254 
For purposes of this subsection, this Article will assume that 
either an ambiguity exists or the teleological method otherwise 
applies. This assumption leads to the consideration of extrinsic 
aids, in particular the legislative history, which is the preferred 
extrinsic aid of the Supreme Court.255 
Use of extrinsic aids is often not decisive because different 
extrinsic aids frequently lead to different results. 256 In addition, 
252. Brummond, supra note 250, at 67; see also Hirsch, supra note 40, at 516. 
253 . See Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of State Law under ERISA, 1979 DUKE 
L.J. 383, 389. 
254. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 23, 53 (1978). 
255. See, e.g., Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) 
(courts can and should consider legislative history even where the language of the statute 
is clear); see also United States v. Public Uti!. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) (when 
the statute is ambiguous, may use legislative history); United States v. Missouri P.R.R., 
278 U.S. 269, 278 (1928) (same) . 
256. Again, the RRA provides an example. The problem in London Borough of Eating 
v. Race Relation Bd. , [1972] App. Cas. 342, [1972] 1 All E.R. 105 (1971), was to determine 
whether discrimination on the basis of "national origins" in the RRA included changeable 
national citizenship. See supra note 220. 
One extrinsic aid is the examination of statutes that are in pari materia with the statute 
in question. Because legislative draftsmen do not change the wording of a statute unless 
they intend a different meaning, the court may glean a statute's meaning by comparing its 
language with earlier, related statutes. Hadley v. Perks, L.R. 1 Q.B. 444, 457 (1866). The 
earlier act, the Race Relations Act of 1965, ch. 73, used the term "national origin," id. 
§§ 1(1), 5(1), 6('1), but not "nationality" as did the RRA. See RRA, §§ 8(11), 27(9) . 
Moreover, the earlier statute had a long title indicating that it prohibited "racial discrim-
ination." Eating, [1972] 1 All E.R. at 111. Using the statutory interpretive canon which 
allows a court to consult statute titles to resolve ambiguities, see K. LLEWELLYN, supra 
note 207, at 524 (Counter-Canon no. 11), Viscount Dilhorne concluded that "national 
origin" meant "racial origin." Eating, [1972] 1 All E.R. at 111. Using statutes in pari 
materia, he further concluded "nationality" did not possess the same meaning as "national 
origin," and, therefore, the Jaw permitted discrimination on the basis of citizenship. Eating, 
[1972] 1 All E .R. at 111-12. 
There is a counter-principle to in pari materia, however, holding that the legislature 
changed the words without intending to change the meaning in an attempt to improve the 
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one extrinsic aid, consideration of the result, permits voiding the 
result obtained through the use of the statutory interpretation 
canons.257 
1. Legislative History 
In the years before the passage of ERISA, congressional com-
mittees heard much testimony about the proposed scope of ERISA 
preemption.258 Some witnesses advocated broad preemption to avoid 
chaotic, dual regulation. 259 Other witnesses urged cooperative fed-
eral and state regulation.260 While both favored some type of 
ERISA preemption, the House and Senate developed different 
proposals. 261 Earlier versions of the preemption provision contained 
style and avoid using the same words over and over. Hadley v. Perks, L.R. I Q.B. 444, 
457 (1866). 
Viscount Dilhorne also consulted a treatise: A. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAw 645 
(8th ed . 1955). When statutes contain terms of art, the court may refer to treatises that 
would show the sense of the words when the legislature passed the statute. In re Castiori, 
[1981) I Q.B. 149. Contrary to his earlier conclusion, Viscount Dilhorne discovered that 
"nationality" included both race and citizenship. Ealing, [1972] I All E.R. at 111-12. If 
he had consulted a different source, the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/ C 3/SR. 1304 (1969), he would have 
discovered that "nl!,tional origins" has no international meaning, according to the Conven-
tion. /d. 
257. When a phrase is capable of two or more interpretations, one of which leads to 
an enormous inconvenience or injustice, the court may give the statute whichever construc-
tion causes the least inconvenience. Reid v. Reid, 31 Ch. D. 402, 407 (1886). 
In his Ealing dissent, Lord Kilbrandon thought that this test had been met. Ealing, 
[1972] I All. E.R. 119-20. A sign saying " No Poles admitted" would not put anyone on 
notice of whether the violator discriminated against Polish nationals or against persons of 
Polish origin. 
258. See generally Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). 
259. E.g., Statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-
CIO, Hearings on H .R. 5741 (Proposed Welfare and Pension Plan Protection Act) before 
the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 186 (1968); Statement by Preston C. Basset on behalf of Towers, 
Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc. , Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 (Proposed Revisions 
of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act) before the General Subcomm. on Labor 
of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 315 (1973); 
Statement of Lauren Upson, Member, California Banker's Association Committee on 
Employee Benefit Trusts, Hearings on H .R. 2 and H.R. 462, supra, pt. 2, at 651. 
260. E.g., Statement of Robert D. Haase, Commissioner of Insurance, State of Wis-
consin, Hearings on H .R. 5741 , supra note 259, at 338; Statement of John P. Thompson 
for The Southland Corporation, Hearings on H .R. 2 and H.R. 462, supra note 259, pt. 
I, at 554-55; Statement of Stanley C. DuRose, Jr., Commissioner of Insurance of the State 
of Wisconsin, Hearings on H.R. 2 and H .R. 462, supra note 259, pt. 2, at 188-95. 
261. See generally Hewlett-Packard, 425 F. Supp. at 1298. 
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narrower forms of preemption, 262 which would have limited pre-
emption to the substantive areas actually covered by the Act and 
to particular types of plans.263 The Ford administration proposed 
a similar preemption provision and requested that the provision 
state clearly that the states could not set minimum standards for 
the aspects of retirement plans listed in the statute, but could set 
standards in other areas such as tax aspects. 264 
The conference committee, however, discarded both the Senate 
and House limited versions and the administration's version of the 
ERISA preemption provision. In their place, the conference com-
mittee substituted an expanded preemption provision reaching all 
state laws relating to employee benefit plans, not just state laws 
governing the regulated substantive areas.265 Statements made in 
the House and Senate debates that preceded enactment of the 
conference committee's version of ERISA preemption indicate that 
both houses believed that the conference committee's change was 
intended to be the broadest possible preemption following the 
procedures of LMRA preemption.266 This broad preemption "would 
create a uniform federal common law regulating employee benefit 
plans.267 
Courts that have ruled on the waivability of ERISA preemption 
have not examined the legislative history, perhaps because it does 
not speak specifically to waiver or procedural laws. These courts 
have relied on two preemption presumptions. First, a court should 
262. See generally Kilberg & Heron, supra note 253, at 390. 
263. See, e.g., S.4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(a) (as introduced Jan. 4, 1973); H.R. 2, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699 (as passed by the Senate on Mar. 4, 1974); id. § 514 (as passed 
by the House on Feb. 28, 1974) ("shall supersede any and all laws of the States and 
political subdivision thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the reporting 
and disclosure responsibilities and fiduciary responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of 
any employee benefit plans ... . "); 120 CoNo. REc. 4742 (1974); S. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 699 (as passed by the Senate on Sept. 19, 1973) ("shall supersede any and all laws 
of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act"); 120 CoNo. REc. 5005 (1974); H.R. 
2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (as introduced Jan. 3, 1973); see also, Hewlett-Packard, 425 
F. Supp. at 1298 n.13, 14 (wording of H.R. 2 as enacted by the House on Feb. 28, 1974; 
different wording of H.R. 2 as enacted by the Senate on Mar. 4, 1974); Turza & Halloway, 
Preemption of State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
28 CATH. L. REv. 163, 167 n.22 {1979). 
264. See Administration Recommendations to the House and Senate Conferees of H .R. 
2 to Provide for Pension Reform, reprinted in 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong. , 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 5145. 
265. Kilberg & Heron, supra note 253, at 390. 
266. See infra notes 271-320 & 323-43 and accompanying text. 
267. See infra notes 344-64 and accompanying text. 
1991] ERISA PREEMPTION 339 
presume that there is no express preemption if the subject matter 
is traditionally subject to state regulation. 268 Traditionally, proce-
dure is an area subject to state formulation. 269 Second, a court 
should presume that there is no express preemption of a state law 
unless Congress explicitly considered that type of state law. 270 While 
legislative history does not specifically mention waiver of preemp-
tion, the following items of legislative history can overcome these 
two presumptions. 
2. The LMRA Practice 
Courts generally use committee reports to confirm statutory 
construction271 or to determine the meaning of ambiguous lan-
guage.272 The conference committee report on ERISA273 detailed 
the procedural rules for the nongovernmental, civil enforcement 
provision in both breach of fiduciary duty and benefits-due suits. 
That conference committee report states that all actions related to 
ERISA plans ''in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as 
arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to 
those brought under section 301 of" LMRA. 274 This confirms the 
plain-meaning construction of the statute and indicates that the 
benefits-due lawsuit, the only one that is triable in state court, is 
in state court only under federal law. Therefore, a state court 
could not hold that a party has waived ERISA preemption and 
268 . See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co . v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) (dealing 
with the savings clause of the ERISA preemption provision); Kilberg & Inman, supra note 
39, 1326; Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: the Meaning of "Relate to" in Section 
514, 58 WASH . U.L.Q. 143, 164-65 (1980). 
269. Federal courts sitting in diversity actions follow some state procedural rules to 
avoid forum shopping. See, e.g. , Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) 
(statute of limitations); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) 
(conflict of law); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 238 (1940) (accrual of 
the cause of action); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210 (1939) (burden of 
proof). But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965) (federal court will not 
follow state rules nullifying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (federal court will not look to state law 
for jury rules) , overruled on other grounds, Hanna , 380 U.S. 460. 
270. See Hirsch, supra note 40, at 538-49. 
271. Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502 (1962); McLean v. United States, 226 
U.S. 374, 380 (1912); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S . (8 Wall .) 603, 610 (1869), overruled 
on other grounds, Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1870). 
272. Wright v. Vinton Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 459 (1937); United States 
v. Missouri Pac . R.R ., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & 
Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S . 443 , 
474 (1921). 
273. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 30. 
274. /d. at 5107; see supra note 18 and accompanying text for LMRA litigation practice. 
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then proceed to hear the lawsuit under state law. Furthermore, 
the committee report reveals that Congress did consider the pre-
emption of state procedural rules concerning ERISA plans. 
Senator Harrison Williams, Jr., then Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 275 a cosponsor of the 
original draft legislation containing a subject-matter preemption 
provision,276 and the floor manager of the bill,277 confirmed the 
scope of ERISA preemption by suggesting that the courts treat 
such actions in the same fashion as LMRA cases. 278 Courts often 
treat the explanations of committee reports made by a committee 
member or the committee chairman as supplemental committee 
reports.279 The Supreme Court used this legislative history in ap-
plying the preemption removal rules of LMRA practice to ERISA 
cases. 280 Under LMRA, the courts also create a uniform federal 
common law, in which state law is a source of potentially com-
patible rules, not an independent source of litigable private rights.281 
LMRA may differ from ERISA as to what law is preempted 
because LMRA lacks an express preemption provision and, there-
fore, has no savings clause. 282 To determine what procedural rules 
apply to ERISA preemption, courts should examine LMRA pre-
emption procedure. 
275. Note, Recent Decisions, 27 DuQ. L. REv. 783, 795 (1989). 
276. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins . Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985); Manno, 
supra note 10, at 61. 
277 . Irish & Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109, 113 {1985). 
278 . See 120 CoNo. REc. S29,933 (daily ed . Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5188-89. "It is intended that such (ERISA) actions will 
be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those 
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act .... " I d. 
279. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475-77 (1921); see also 
Wright v. Vinton Mountain Trust Bank , 300 U.S. 440, 459 (1937) (explanations given in 
Congress make meaning plain); Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312, 322 
(1934) (chairman of committee so stated); United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 
269, 278 (1929) (statements by those in charge); Railroad Comm'n. v. Chicago, B. & 
Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922) (explanatory statements of members in charge); United 
States v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918) (remarks in nature of supplementary 
report); United States v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U.S . 265, 281 (1916) (chairman explaining 
the provision). 
280. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins . Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987) (benefits-
due lawsuit); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 
560 n.2 (1968) (Courts will consider LMRA preemption alleged in the answer part of the 
complaint for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint doctrine for determining removal for 
a federal cause of action). 
281. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S . 448, 456-57 (1957). 
282 . See Sherrich, ERISA Preemption: An Introduction, 64 MICH. B.J. 1074, 1078-79 
(1985) . 
1991] ERISA PREEMPTION 341 
The Supreme Court's characterization of Section 301 of LMRA 
as an example of a preemption that involves a choice of law283 
could mean that courts considering LMRA preemption should find 
it waivable for this reason. Most courts, however, have followed 
the Supreme Court's directive to eschew the choice-of-law/choice-
of-forum distinction under LMRA,284 and they agree on the non-
waivability of LMRA preemption. Six courts have decided non-
governmental, civil actions involving LMRA preemption raised 
initially after trial or on appeal. Five courts held that the litigant 
had not waived LMRA preemption, and the sixth determined that 
the litigant had waived preemption. 
a. Nonwaivable 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits and state courts in Illinois and 
Alabama have decided that when a litigant initially raises LMRA 
preemption on appeal, the litigant has not waived preemption. 
Both state and federal courts can assert jurisdiction over both 
benefits-due and non-benefits-due lawsuits under LMRA. 285 Unlike 
the ERISA cases, the LMRA nonwaivability cases do not consider 
whether the court would have had jurisdiction under LMRA if the 
plaintiff had pled it. These courts may believe that the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck286 mandates this 
result. Under Lueck, when a state claim depends substantially on 
analyzing a collective bargaining agreement, the court must treat 
the claim as a Section 301 claim or dismiss it.287 Unless it recasts 
the state lawsuit as an LMRA lawsuit, the court lacks jurisdiction 
over the state claim due to LMRA preemption. 
Another reason the courts give for finding nonwaivability of 
LMRA preemption is the federal policy seeking uniformity in the 
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. The Supreme 
Court cited this reason for recognition of LMRA preemption288 
when, as with NLRA, the statute lacked an express preemption 
provision. Although ERISA has an express provision, it embodies 
the same policy of uniformity in the law. 289 
283. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 391 (1986) . 
284. !d. at 391 n.9. 
285 . See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. 
286. 471 u.s. 202, 220 (1985) . 
287. !d. 
288. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc ., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988) ("[Section) 
301 mandated resort to federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of 
collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution 
of labor-management disputes .") 
289. See infra notes 344-64 and accompanying text. 
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In National Metalcrajters v. McNeil, 290 the Seventh Circuit noted 
that preemption is usually an affirmative defense which litigants 
waive unless they plead.291 There are exceptions to this rule, 
however, other than subject matter jurisdiction, such as federal 
policy grounds.292 The strong public policy underlying Section 301 
requires applying uniform federal principles to the interpretation 
of collective bargaining contracts.293 McNeil, however, involved a 
multipoint opinion in which the court also found NLRA preemp-
tion. 294 The court refused to address ERISA preemption to avoid 
further weakening the LMRA holding. 295 
In Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 296 the Sixth Circuit followed 
McNeil and observed that a compelling federal policy favored a 
uniform application of federal law to enforce labor contracts. 297 
The court noted that the rule in Lueck mandated its refusal to 
recognize a waiver of the preemption. 298 
In Sagen v. Jewel Cos., Inc. ,299 an Illinois appellate court also 
followed McNei/. 300 The court determined that LMRA preemption 
290. 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.). 
291. !d. at 825-26. 
In McNeil, an employer sought a declaratory judgment that a state statute concerning 
payments to a vacation plan under a collective bargaining agreement was p~eempted by 
LMRA, NLRA, and ERISA. /d. at 820. Judge Posner addressed only LMRA and NLRA. 
The defendant had not raised LMRA preemption in the trial court other than under the 
rubric of federal labor law, mentioning specifically only NLRA. /d. at 825. The appellate 
court reversed and directed the trial court to enter the declaration desired by the employer. 
/d. at 829. 
292. !d. at 825-36; see, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 119, 121 (1976) ("We 
announce no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate 
court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution 
is beyond any doubt ... or where 'injustice might otherwise result' .... ");Capitol Indem. 
Corp. v. Keller, 717 F.2d 324, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J .) (for serious and sensitive 
issues of federalism or plain error). 
293. McNeil, 784 F.2d at 825-26. 
294. /d. at 826-29. See supra note 107 for weakened authority of multipoint opinions. 
295. McNeil, 784 F.2d at 822-23 . 
296. 809 F.2d 1210 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). 
In Apponi, employees sued for benefits due under a pension plan subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement for pre-ERISA service. !d. at 1213. The employer failed to raise 
LMRA preemption until the second appeal. /d. at 1215 . The court remanded for jury trial 
on those elements of LMRA law not previously considered. !d. at 1217, 1220. 
297 . /d. at 1215. 
298 . /d. 
299. 148 Ill. App. 3d. 447, 499 N.E.2d 662 (1986). 
In Sagen, an employee sued for tortious interference with her union-negotiated employ-
ment contract. /d. at 449, 499 N.E.2d at 663. The employer first raised preemption by 
supplemental brief before the appellate court. !d. 
300. /d. at 450, 499 N.E .2d at 664. 
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was jurisdictional and, therefore, was not waivable. 301 Subse-
quently, in Netzel v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 302 another inter-
mediate Illinois appellate court determined, on the basis of Lueck, 
that LMRA preemption was jurisdictional, and, therefore, the 
court could raise the matter sua sponte. 303 After a reconsideration 
mandated by the Illinois Supreme Court, the appellate court found 
no preemption. 304 
The Alabama Supreme Court, in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays, 305 
also determined that the litigant had not waived preemption. 306 
Upon reconsideration mandated by the United States Supreme 
Court, the Alabama Supreme Court found no preemption. 307 
The foregoing court opinions do not encompass the entire LMRA 
litigation concerning waivability. Cases prior to both ERiSA's 
enactment and the recent confusion concerning the waivability of 
ERISA preemption, although not directly addressing the issue, 
indicate that a litigant cannot waive LMRA preemption. Local 
174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,308 
the case in which the United States Supreme Court first considered 
LMRA preemption, involved a union that was sued for strike 
damages, and the union raised federal law preemption only in its 
motion for a new trial in state court, specifically naming only 
NLRA. 309 The union did not raise LMRA jurisdictional preemption 
· under Section 301 until it filed a writ of certiorari after it had lost 
in the state supreme court. 310 The Washington Supreme Court had 
301. Jd. 
302. 165 Ill. App. 3d 685, 520 N.E.2d 665 (1988), modified, 181 Ill . App. 3d 808, 537 
N.E.2d 1348 (1989) (ordered by the Illinois Supreme Court on the basis of Lingle v. Norge 
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (retaliatory discharge doesn't relate to 
collective bargaining agreement)) . 
The Netzel court faced a retaliatory discharge action in which the employer first raised 
LMRA preemption on appeal. Netzel, 165 Ill . App. 3d at 686, 520 N.E.2d at 666. 
303. /d. at 695, 520 N.E.2d at 671·72. 
304. Netzel, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 811, 537 N.E.2d at 1349. 
305. 516 So. 2d $17 (Ala. 1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 1050 (1988) (for reconsideration 
under Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. , 486 U.S . 399 (1988) (retaliatory discharge 
does not relate to collective bargaining agreement)), on remand, 547 So. 2d 518 (Ala. 1989) 
(no preemption). 
The Mays court faced a retaliatory discharge and associated defamation action in which 
the employer raised LMRA preemption initially on appeal. Mays, 516 So. 2d at 518. 
306. ld. at 519. 
307. ld. at 522-23. 
308. 369 u.s. 95 (1962). 
309. Petitioner's Brief at 8, Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) [hereinafter Petitioner's 
Brief] (memorandum of authorities and motion for dismissal mentioned only NLRA 
preemption under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)). 
310. Petitioner's Brief at 8 (first mention of Section 301 of LMRA was in respondent's 
brief to the Washington Supreme Court). 
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used LMRA as support for its jurisdiction to affirm the lower 
court's judgment, but it had applied state law substantively. 311 The 
United States Supreme Court held that the Washington court had 
jurisdiction under LMRA, but it must apply federal law. After 
applying federal law, the Court affirmed the judgment. 312 The 
Supreme Court has subsequently referred to Lucas Flour Co. as 
defining the scope of LMRA preemption when the defendant has 
raised the application of the uniform federal laws for the first 
time on appeal. 313 
The Ninth Circuit considered an LMRA benefits-due lawsuit 
removed to federal court on diversity. 314 The plan trustees raised 
LMRA Section 301 on appeal to demand application of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard in an attempt to overturn the state 
review standard used by the district court. 315 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed and remanded with instructions to apply the uniform 
federal law. 316 
The result is that whenever a party raises the applicability of 
LMRA, the court must apply the uniform federal law, reversing 
and remanding the case if necessary, or dismissing the case for 
lack of jurisdiction. 317 Because the Supreme Court has indicated 
that Congress modeled ERISA preemption after LMRA preemp-
tion, 318 lower courts should determine that ERISA preemption is 
likewise not waivable. The Supreme Court suggested that the 
reference to LMRA in ERISA's legislative history is meaningless 
if an ERISA action could be supplemented by a state action. 319 
The directive to follow the LMRA litigation indicates that the 
bifurcations created by some appellate courts applying different 
waivability rules to different types of lawsuit or forum under 
ERISA, are in error because LMRA holdings make no such 
distinction. 
b. Waivable 
The Ninth Circuit, in Johnson v. Armored Transport of Cali-
fornia, Inc. ,320 enunciated a lone opinion holding that a defendant 
311. Lucas Flour Co. v. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 356 P.2d I, 5 (Wash. 
1960), aff'd, 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
312. Lucas Flour Co. , 369 U.S. at 103-04. 
313. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 n.3 (1988). 
314. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976). 
315 . /d. at 1368-70; see also HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513 , 520 
n.ll (5th Cir. 1988) (claiming the Rehmar court sua sponte raised Section 301 of LMRA). 
316. Rehmar, 555 F.2d at 1372. 
317. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1985). 
318 . Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). 
319. /d. at 56 . 
320. 813 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1987); see also supra note 176. 
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has waived LMRA preemption when not raised at trial. The court 
based its opinion, however, on a prior ERISA case.321 As a result, 
the opinion on its own does not accurately reflect LMRA practice. 
3. Broad Preemption 
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the ERISA 
preemption provision provides evidence of the broad scope of that 
preemption. The record consists of prior versions of the provision, 
the conference report, statements made by various committee 
members, and the postpassage congressional report on the desira-
bility of the provision. 
During passage of ERISA preemption, the state laws preempted 
evolved from those narrowly affecting regulated subject matter to 
those more broadly affecting employee benefit plans. 322 Courts 
consider statutory construction arguments based on changes made 
during the passage or rejection of statutes unreliable. 323 Although 
courts may use these changes to help interpret doubtful or ambig-
uous provisions,324 the arguments are generally unreliable because 
the court usually is unable to determine why the legislature rejected 
the prior language. 325 In this case, however, a prominent member 
of the conference committee, Senator Jacob Javits, the other 
cosponsor of the original draft legislation containing a subject-
matter preemption provision326 and the senior ranking Republican 
on the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 327 ex-
plained that the Committee rejected the language to avoid "endless 
litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on 
Federal regulation.' '328 Allowing waiver of ERISA preemption would 
permit some state regulation to displace the uniform federal law 
of employee benefit plans. 
The conference committee's report also indicates that Congress 
intended courts to give broad preemptive effect to the preemption 
321. Id. at 1043-44. 
322. See supra notes 258-65 and accompanying text. 
323. See, e.g., Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716 (1888) . 
324. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S . 16, 23-24 (1983) (deletion by Congress of 
limiting language contained in an earlier version implies the limitation was not intended to 
apply); United States v. St. P ., M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918) . 
325. See, e.g., Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S . 87, 96 (1935) (not conclusive of 
meaning); Pennsylvania R.R . v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1913) 
(a Senate Conference Committee member contended an omission by amendment did not 
exclude, contrary to the Conference Committee report) . 
326. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985) (Brennan, 
J ., concurring); Manno, supra note 10, at 61. 
327. Note, supra note 275, at 795 . 
328. 120 CoNG. REc . S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974). 
346 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
provision.329 Examining this language in light of the preceding bills, 
the Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ,330 stated that 
"the Conference Committee ... indicated that the section's pre-
emptive scope was as broad as its language. " 331 Under the plain-
meaning rule, this language preempts all state laws relating to 
employee benefit plans, and makes no distinction between sub-
stantive and procedural laws. 
Two conference committee members made statements concerning 
the breadth of the preemption. Senator Williams stated that courts 
were to construe the preemption provision ''in its broadest sense 
to all actions of State or local governments" to eliminate incon-
sistent state regulation. 332 This statement, by the leader of the 
committee considering the bill on behalf of the whole Senate, 
establishes congressional intent that the provision be given the 
widest possible preemptive effect to override state law. 
The House heard similar statements, and another prominent 
legislator interpreted ERISA's preemption provision to have the 
broadest possible effect. Representative John Dent, the Chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Labor of the House Labor and Education 
Committee333 and House sponsor of the original legislation, 334 
explained that the preemption provision's effect was "the reser-
vation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field 
of employee benefit plans" and that courts were to apply "this 
principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regu-
lation of employee benefit plans. " 335 
329. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 30, at 5162. 
/d. 
Under the substitute, the provisions of title I are to supersede all State laws 
that relate to any employee benefit plan that is established by an employer 
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee organization that 
represents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce .. .. 
The preemption provisions of title I are not to exempt any person from any 
State law that regulates insurance, banking or securities. 
330. 463 u.s. 85 (1983) . 
331. Id. at 98; see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482 (1990) (ERISA 
preemption provision interpreted in the broad sense); FMC Corp . v. Holliday, Ill S. Ct. 
403 , 407 (1990) (ERISA "preemption clause is conspicuous for its breadth") . 
332. 120 CoNo. REc. S29,933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S . CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5188-89. "It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions 
specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute 
are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulation, thus eliminating the threat of 
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. " !d. 
(emphasis added). 
333. Note, supra note 275, at 795 . 
334. Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot 
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1343, 1355 (1988). 
335. 120 CoNo. REc . H29,197 (daily ed . Aug. 22, 1974). "Thus, the provisions of 
1991] ERISA PREEMPTION 347 
Additional congressional explanation appeared in a 1977 report 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor after it received 
the Joint Pension Task Force study.336 This report indicated that 
ERISA preemption was "expressly extended to occupy the field to 
the exclusion of state authority" and was to be "sufficiently broad 
to leave no room for effective state regulation. " 337 Although a 
report is not contemporaneous legislative history, it is virtually 
conclusive as to legislative intent and is persuasive authority for 
demonstrating congressional intent. 338 This report supports the 
broadest possible interpretation of ERISA preemption. 
Considering this legislative history, courts should conclude, as 
did the Barry court, 339 that Congress intended them to construe 
the ERISA preemption provision as broadly as possible to end 
state law in this arena and replace it with federal law. Any narrower 
application of preemption would not eliminate the encroachment 
of inconsistent state laws. 
After the creation of this legislative history, the Supreme Court 
has recognized at least one nonwaivable preemption in implicit 
NLRA preemption. 340 Explicit ERISA preemption should at least 
equal the breadth of implicit NLRA preemption, which does not 
recognize waivability. Therefore, a state court could only assert 
subject matter jurisdiction over a pension fund case through ERISA, 
because the alternative state law no longer exists due to the broad 
preemption. 
section 514 would reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision of any State, subdivision 
thereof or any agency or instrumentality thereof . . . which would affect any employee 
benefit plan as described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b)." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
336. ERISA Sections 3021 and 3022 created the Joint Pension, Profit-Sharing, and 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan Task Force to study within two years of ERISA's effective 
date, among other items, the effects and desirability of ERISA preemption. 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1221-22 (1988). 
337. H.R. REP. No. 1785 (Activity Report of the House Comm. on Education & Labor), 
94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 46-47 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1785]. 
Based on our examination of the effects of section 514, it is our judgment 
that the legislative scheme of ERISA is sufficiently broad to leave no room for 
effective state regulation within the field preempted. Similarly it is our finding 
that the Federal interest and the need for national uniformity are so great that 
the enforcement of a state regulation should be precluded . ... Accordingly, any 
activity by a state or political subdivision thereof, which relates to employee 
benefit plans ... is preempted by section 514(a). 
/d. (emphasis added) . 
338. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S . 317, 329-30 (1942). 
339. Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys., Inc., 394 Mass. 830, 478 N.E.2d 707 (1985); see 
supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text. 
340. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380 (1986). 
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ERISA preemption is jurisdictional and nonwaivable. To con-
clude otherwise could result in inconsistent state law which would 
be contrary to the intended result expressed in the explanations 
for the legislative change, the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the conference committee's report, Senator Williams's and Rep-
resentative Dent's statements , and the review committee's stated 
understanding. Senator Javits suggested that if experience reveals 
the ERISA preemption provision to be overly broad on policy 
grounds, Congress, not the judiciary, should modify the provision 
by creating exceptions in pursuit of a better policy. 341 The limited 
success of congressional attempts to narrow ERISA preemption342 
and the Supreme Court's adherence to literalism343 mandate that 
courts apply ERISA preemption broadly and literally, thereby 
excluding waivability of ERISA preemption. If future policy de-
terminations demand an exception to ERISA preemption, Con-
gress, not the courts, should fashion it. 
341. 120 CoNo. REc. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1974). 
The conferees-recognizing the dimensions of such a [preemption) policy-also 
agreed to assign the Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of 
studying and evaluating preemption in connection with State authorities and 
reporting its findings to the Congress. If it is determined that the preemption 
policy devised has the effect of precluding essential legislation at either the State 
or Federal level, appropriate modifications can be made. 
/d.; see also Irish & Cohen, supra note 277, at 113. 
342. See Irish & Cohen, supra note 277, at 114-15. 
In 1979, Senators Williams and Javits drafted a bill, S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 
CoNo. REc. 933 (1979), to create additional exceptions for ground-breaking state legislations, 
125 CoNo. REc. 947 (1979) (Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, struck down in Standard 
Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 
1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981)); to uphold one court created implied exception, 
125 CoNo. REc. 947 (1979) (divorce decrees under Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F .2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981)); to 
overrule another court created implied exception, 125 CoNo. REc . 947 (1979) (laws requiring 
mental health benefits in group insurance policies under Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 
70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978)); and to affirm two denials of court 
implied exceptions, 125 CoNo. REc. 947 (1979) (insurance inquiry into benefit status of 
participants under Azzaro v. Harnett , 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977), and state taxes measured in 
terms of benefit paid under National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. 
Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978)). 
Congress only partially adopted two of these modifications: (I) to permit partial enforce-
ment of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(b), 96 Stat. 2605, 
2612 (1983); and (2) to permit qualifying domestic relations orders thereby excluding other 
domestic relations orders. Pub. L. No. 98-97, § 104, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36 (1984). 
343. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983); Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); see also Note, ERISA Preemption 
of California Tort and Bad Faith Law: What's Left?, 22 U.S.F. L. REv . 519, 532 (1988) 
(it is clear the Supreme Court will apply ERISA preemption with expansive force). 
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4. Uniformity 
Another strand of legislative history relates to the desire of 
Congress to establish uniform federal rules for employee benefit 
plans. This appears both in the committee reports and in statements 
of committee members. 
The purpose of a uniform federal law regulating private em-
ployee benefit plans was to encourage the growth of such plans. 
A House committee report on one of the predecessor bills to 
ERISA noted that ''the objective is to increase the number of 
individuals participating in employer-financed plans ... [and to] 
continue[] the approach in present law of encouraging the estab-
lishment of retirement plans which contain socially desirable pro-
visions . . . . '' 344 The Senate report urging the passage of ERISA 
noted that ERISA ''will also serve to restore credibility and faith 
in the private pension plans designed for American working men 
and women, and this should serve to encourage rather than di-
minish efforts by management and industry to expand pension 
plan coverage and to improve benefits for workers. " 345 Senator 
Williams noted that ERISA was "designed to improve and en-
courage the expansion of private pension plans. " 346 The ranking 
majority member of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
Representative AI Ullman, made similar remarks on the introduc-
tion of the conference committee report that led to ERISA's 
passage. He stated that ERISA's requirements were "carefully 
designed to provide adequate protection for employees and, at the 
same time, provide a favorable setting for the growth and devel-
opment of private pension plans. " 347 
The key to this uniformity and encouragement is the ERISA 
preemption provision insuring that state law will not upset the 
delicate balance between employees and employers. The Supreme 
Court has recognized this delicate ''balancing of the need for 
prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public 
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. " 348 
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare indicated that Congress intended ERISA preemption to 
344. H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong ., 2d Sess. 8 (1974). 
345 . S. REP. No . 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEws 4838 , 4849 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 127] . 
346. 120 CoNG. REc . S29,928 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974). 
347. 120 CONG. REC. H29,198 (daily ed. Aug. 20) reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEws 5166-67. " This legislation provides urgently needed reform in the pension 
area. But, at the same time, it continues the basic governmental policy of encouraging the 
growth and development of voluntary private pension plans." /d. 
348. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 54 (1987). 
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create uniformity in employee benefit law in order to give interstate 
plan fiduciaries certainty about the legality of their actions without 
reference to varying state laws.349 One of these fiduciary standards 
is ERISA's arbitrary and capricious review standard for discre-
tionary fiduciary decisions. 350 
The report of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor 
stated that ERISA alone was "a uniform source of law" for 
fiduciary standards.351 The reason was "to remove jurisdictional 
and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have ham-
pered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state 
law.' ' 352 This is evidence that Congress considered state procedural 
rules when creating the preemption provision. As a result, ERISA 
preemption is jurisdictional and not waivable. 
Senator J avits revealed the bipartisan nature of the ERISA 
preemption provision in similar statements concerning the efficacy 
of the provision. He indicated that ''the interests of uniformity 
... required" that the ERISA preemption provision provide for 
349. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 345, at 4865, 4871. 
Furthermore, a fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation is considered 
desirable because it will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions 
under the same set of facts may differ from state to state .... 
Finally, it is evident that the operations of employee benefit plans are increas-
ingly interstate. The uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to foster 
will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of 
proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws . ... 
. . . [S]tate law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of employee 
benefit plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uniform source 
of law in the areas of vesting, funding, insurance and portability standards, for 
evaluating fiduciary conduct, and for creating a single reporting and disclosure 
system in lieu of burdensome multiple reports . 
/d. (emphasis added). 
350. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
351. S. REP . No. 533, 93d Cong ., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoNG. CODE & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4655 . 
The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable 
remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional 
and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective 
enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law for recovery of benefits 
due to participants .... 
Except where plans are not subject to this Act and in certain other enumerated 
circumstances, state law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of 
employee benefit plans, the committee believes it essential to provide for a 
uniform source of law in the areas of vesting, funding, insurance and portability 
standards, for evaluation of fiduciary conduct, and for creating a single reporting 
and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome multiple reports . . .. 
/d. (emphasis added). 
352. /d. 
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''the displacement of State action in the field of private employee 
benefit programs. " 353 This pronouncement indicates that the ERISA 
preemption provision supersedes state law. Therefore, state law 
cannot constitute the basis of state court jurisdiction, confirming 
the construction of the ERISA preemption provision under the 
plain-meaning rule. 
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor 
resulting from the Joint Pension Task Force study indicated that 
Congress intends the ERISA preemption to bring about the uni-
formity of decision necessary for plan fiduciaries to determine 
their actions without reference to state laws.354 
The Supreme Court has also declared that the legislative history 
of the comprehensive remedies provided by ERISA's jurisdictional 
provision indicates a congressional intent to displace state law to 
prevent state actions from supplementing the federal remedies. 355 
When the state law falls within the preemption savings clause but 
affects the federal remedies, ERISA preempts that state law.356 
This legislative history indicates a clear intent to make the rules 
governing employee benefit plans nationally uniform. In another 
context, without examining the legislative history, the Supreme 
Court ruled on waiver of preemption under a statute through 
which Congress had intended to create uniform rules. When the 
Supreme Court first recognized preemption of state law by NLRA 
for unfair labor practices, it did so for reasons of uniformity. 357 
353. 120 CoNo. REc. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974); see also id. at S29,933 (statement 
of Sen . Williams that ERISA preemption is to eliminate "the threat of conflicting or 
inconsistent state and local regulation of employee benefit plans"); id. at H29,197 (statement 
of Rep. Dent that ERISA preemption is to reserve "to Federal authority the sole power 
to regulate the field of employee benefit plans") . 
354. SeeS . REP. No. 127, supra note 345, at 4865-71. 
355. Pilot Life Ins. Co . v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987). 
356. !d.; see also Roberson v. Equitable Assurance Soc'y, 661 F. Supp. 416, 424 (C .D. 
Cal. 1987), aff'd mem., 869 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1989); Note, supra note 334, at 1382. 
357. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Garmon 
court noted: 
"Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially de-
signed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive 
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety 
of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies .... A multiplicity 
of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible 
or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law . . .. " 
... To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central 
aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power 
asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it mattered 
whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather 
than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations . 
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Although NLRA has no express preemption provision, the Court 
recognized preemption because of a perceived conflict between 
state and federal regulation of the same subject. 358 The Court 
recognized that a conflict could frustrate the national purpose of 
fostering unionization, NLRA's function, by permitting bodies of 
state law to arise. 359 For this reason, the Court found that NLRA 
preemption was jurisdictional and nonwaivable. 360 
Courts should find that ERISA preemption is also jurisdictional 
and nonwaivable. Because ERISA preemption is express and not 
implicit, the uniformity sought concerns only encroachment by, 
and not accommodation with, state law. The function of ERISA 
is to foster private pension plans.361 To advance that purpose, 
Congress has created a system of uniform regulation under federal 
law by eradicating state law. The only real difference between 
NLRA and ERISA is that ERISA contains express provisions and 
express legislative history. Therefore, under ERISA, the court does 
not need to infer an intent from the procedures outlined in the 
statute. 
There is one more policy reason for adhering to an exclusive 
federal remedy and denying supplemental state actions through 
waiver. Most benefits-due claims are small in comparison to state 
punitive damages. This results in a reluctance by employee-bene-
ficiary attorneys to negotiate settlements when state punitive dam-
ages are involved. 362 Elimination of the possibility of state punitive 
damages removes the greatest obstacle to settlement, reduces the 
stakes, and fosters settlement negotiations. 363 This comports with 
Senator Javits's statement that Congress intended ERISA preemp-
tion to eliminate endless litigation over the validity of state action 
Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct which is 
the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national 
purposes. 
/d. at 242-44 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 455, 490-91 (1953)). 
358. See, e.g., R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 767 (1976) (conflict between substantive provisions of laws and potential conflict 
between enforcement bodies). 
359. /d. at 4-5 (describing Section 7 of NLRA as protecting the right to unionize, and 
Section 8 of NLRA as prohibiting prohibit employer deterrence practices). 
360. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S . 380, 398-99 (1986). 
361. See supra notes 345-48; see also Manno, supra note 10, at 51 (suggesting that plan 
administrators, faced with inconsistent federal and state judicial pronouncements, will 
terminate employee benefit plans). 
362. See Chittenden, ERISA Preemption: The Demise of Bad Faith Actions in Group 
Insurance Cases, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J . 517, 531 (1988). 
363. See id. 
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that might impinge on federal regulation. 364 Admitting waivability 
only fosters that prohibited litigation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on both the ERISA preemption provision's literal words 
and its legislative history, any court following the Supreme Court's 
directive in determining the procedural effect of ERISA preemption 
must conclude that a litigant can raise ERISA preemption for the 
first time after trial or on appeal.365 Congressional intent, expressed 
364. See supra note 328. 
365. Recently, the United States Supreme Court considered a case in which ERISA 
preemption was first raised on appeal, but the case did not involve waiver. In Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990), rev 'g, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), an 
employee sued his employer for wrongful discharge under Texas law. !d. at 481. The 
termination occurred four months before contributions to a pension plan would have been 
required. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 73 (dissenting opinion). Texas follows the employment-
at-will doctrine, and the employer obtained summary judgment. McClendon, Ill S. Ct. at 
481. The judgment, affirmed by a Texas appellate court, was reversed by the Texas Supreme 
Court on public policy grounds. !d. The Texas Supreme Court created a new exception to 
the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is terminated to avoid a pension plan 
contribution under ERISA and remanded to determine the employer's intent for the 
termination. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71, 73. 
Because this was the first mention of ERISA in the case, the employer explicitly raised 
the issue of ERISA preemption for the first time in its motion for rehearing. Respondent ' s 
Motion for Rehearing at 3, 16, McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co ., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 
1989) (No. C-7973). The United States Supreme Court considered the ERISA preemption 
issue without addressing possible waiver. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. at 482. 
McClendon did not involve waiver of ERISA preemption. Waiver can only occur if a 
matter is not timely raised initially. See generally Hatchell & Calvert, Some Problems of 
Supreme Court Review, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 303, 306 (1974) (an error is preserved in trial 
court through objection in trial court, if the error occurs there). Usually, the matter would 
be raised at trial, but frequently the matter is raised or the error occurs at an appellate 
level. In the latter situation, it is proper to raise the objection for the first time at the 
appellate level. See Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 53 n.38 (1965) (point of 
collateral estoppel was preserved by raising it initially in the motion for rehearing in the 
circuit court, when estoppel was based on a circuit court opinion arising between the 
argument and the opinion); Moore v. Dilworth, 142 Tex. 538, 543-44, 179 S.W.2d 940, 
942 (1944) (error of appellate court not preserved by omitting it from motion for rehearing 
when error was failure to remand rather than render decision). Because ERISA's application 
to McClendon first arose in the Texas Supreme Court, the first opportunity to raise the 
matter of ERISA preemption was in the motion for rehearing. Therefore, the matter could 
not have been waived . 
In McClendon, the Texas Supreme Court interjected ERISA due to a quirk in Texas 
summary judgment law. Texas summary judgment law provides that defendant movants 
have the burden to show conclusively that plaintiff nonmovants cannot prove their case by 
showing one missing element. See Combs v. Fantastic Homes, Inc., 584 S. W.2d 340, 343 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (the losing nonmovant may raise on appeal the insufficiency of the 
movant's evidence to show that there is no fact issue), approved, 596 S. W.2d 502 (Tex. 
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in both ERISA's language and legislative history, mandates this 
result. ERISA actions are to follow the LMRA practice of non-
waivability of preemption. ERISA preemption should be as broad 
as possible and should be at least as extensive as NLRA preemp-
tion, which does not recognize waivability of preemption. The 
function of ERISA is to encourage the development of the private 
employee benefit system through the development of a uniform 
federal law governing employee benefit plans. To permit waiver 
of ERISA preemption, as some courts have done, thwarts this 
congressional intent. 
1979). Therefore, in McClendon, the mere mention, in response to the motion in the trial 
court, that the termination occurred four months before the employer would have been 
required to make a contribution to the pension plan raised the fact question of whether 
the termination was to avoid the contribution . 
Unlike Texas summary judgment law, federal summary judgment law places the burden 
of proof on the other party. Once the defendant files and supports .its motion with some 
evidence, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove its case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) ("Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment . .. against a party 
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"); 
Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Stan-
dards?, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 770, 779 (1988). Because most states follow the federal 
procedural rule, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 83, § 62, at 406, the Texas result is not likely 
to be available in other procedural systems . 
